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Property rights must be understood as a fundamental human right.2 The body and mind are the first and most immediate 
property of persons and thus respect for this 
property is related to the respect of the integrity 
of the individual.3 Throughout history the idea 
of human rights has developed in close associa-
tion with the idea of private property rights.4 
Early defenders of human rights considered 
property rights as important as freedom of reli-
gion and freedom of speech. But the majority of 
the world’s population does not have adequate 
access to secure property rights, and their reali-
sation remains an arena for social and political 
contestation. 
Absence of Property Rights and 
Poverty
The absence or insecurity of property rights is a 
central and ubiquitous cause of poverty, not only 
in the very poorest states, but also in middle-
income countries such as Brazil, Russia, India 
and China.5 The relationship between absence of 
property rights and poverty is moving from argu-
ment and anecdote to comparative analysis and 
measurement. Secure property rights facilitate 
economic transactions, ensure efficient and sus-
tainable resource use, allow for the evolution of 
effective credit markets, improve business climate 
and investment opportunities, and ensure eco-
nomic accountability and transparency. Equally, 
the absence of such rights undermines economic 
development and hinders governance. Analysis of 
the World Bank’s Country Performance and Insti-
tutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings for 2005 indi-
cates that on a scale of 1 to 6 (with 1 being the 
lowest score), only five of 76 developing countries 
scored 4 on objective measurement of property 
rights and rule-based governance.6 As all five are 
small island states, this indication confirms that 
property rights of the absolute majority of the peo-
ple in developing countries are not protected in 
theory or practice, contracts are not enforced, and 
registries and other institutions required to protect 
property function poorly or not at all.7
Especially Vulnerable Groups
Certain groups are frequently and systematically 
disenfranchised through lack of access to prop-
erty rights in many countries. Women, who con-
stitute half of the world’s population, own around 
10 percent of the world’s property.8 Virginia Woolf 
eloquently expressed the long arch of history that 
has not only excluded women from property in 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Property Rights are Human Rights
‘Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others …  .  
  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.’1 
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the West, but that has made entire state institu-
tions masculine preserves.9 Even when women 
have de jure property rights, their de facto control 
of land is tenuous, and men largely mediated 
access. In Imo and Abia states in Nigeria, for 
example, average household farms are 9.8 hec-
tares, of which only 2.4 hectares are allocated 
to women. However, this land is not a claim, but 
rather a lease, which women must organise from 
their husbands. Further, widows cannot own land; 
their husband’s family keep it in trust for their 
children.10 As Robin Nielsen has pointed out: 
‘At various stages in women’s lives, their rights 
to land are dependent on fathers, brothers, hus-
bands and sons. A more precarious foundation for 
land rights is difficult to imagine.’11 Ensuring that 
women’s names appear on land records, that their 
rights are enshrined in communal property sys-
tems, and that inheritance rights of widows and 
daughters are established and protected, would 
go a long way towards improving their condition. 
This is essential to empowerment and the pro-
motion of entrepreneurial activity and should be 
placed at the centre of property reform efforts.
Equally, indigenous people around the world tend 
to suffer from weak or prescribed property rights 
not adequately recognised by law. These groups 
often hold land collectively, so ownership and 
access patterns do not always fit easily into im-
ported, non-indigenous property systems of ab-
solute and individual nature. As they are largely 
disenfranchised, the customary land rights of the 
indigenous tend to be overlooked. The Abayanda 
Pygmies in Uganda, for example, have been 
entirely dispossessed of their land; they have 
endured persistent lack of recognition by the 
central government of legitimate claims to their 
property. Indeed, the problem is far from solved 
in developed countries. In 1902, Norway passed 
legislation requiring full knowledge of the Norwe-
gian language for property ownership, effectively 
making it impossible for the indigenous Sami to 
own land.
In 2004 an International Labour Organisation (ILO) expert committee concluded that an Act 
passed in 2003 to rectify centuries of exclusion-
ary practices still did not meet the minimum 
standards for the ILO convention on the rights of 
indigenous and tribal peoples.12 Global reform 
of property rights regimes must allow for formal 
recognition of customary land rights as the basis 
for inclusive property systems that include indig-
enous peoples. There are some good examples 
in The Commonwealth Native Title Act of 1993 
in Australia, and the landmark Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Act in New Zealand, both of which respect 
the customary land rights of indigenous groups. 
Although time will tell if laws of this nature can 
change deeply entrenched exclusionary prac-
tices, but legal empowerment for poor indigenous 
groups will certainly remain key to tackling this 
challenge in both OECD and developing coun-
tries.
Urban slum dwellers are also excluded from 
formal property systems. At least a third of the 
world’s poor, or a billion people, are living in 
slums without legal protection of their assets.13 
Ironically, it is often insecurity of land tenure 
and wrongful loss of land in rural areas that en-
courage the poor to escape, while their property 
rights in urban areas are no less tenuous. The 
reality of urban slum dwellers is sub-standard 
housing conditions, forceful evictions, extortion, 
social exclusion, and environmental degradation, 
among other problems. The situation prevents 
development of adequate housing stock and the 
emergence of robust property and credit markets. 
Informal property systems are often perpetuated 
in conflict-affected countries by flows of refugees 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from ru-
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ral to urban areas, and this leads to further inse-
curity and overcrowding.
Legal access to property rights for various groups 
is clearly an over-arching and universal issue 
that should be at the centre of global efforts to 
empower the poor; but it has in fact received very 
little coherent analysis to date. To unpack the 
relationship between poverty and property rights 
we must understand that it is these rights that 
provide the basis for economic growth. The global 
economy grew very slowly until the beginning of 
the 19th Century. Before then, and for thousands 
of years, notes Jeffrey Sachs, ‘there had been 
virtually no sustained economic growth in the 
world’.14 However, with the advent of the indus-
trial revolution and economic expansion, assets 
expanded and property rights evolved. Slowly the 
idea of private property ownership came to un-
derpin economic development in the West. While 
social, economic and political stability was upset 
by two World Wars and the Great Depression, the 
GI Bill of Rights in the United States, the Mar-
shall Plan and the incipient economic and politi-
cal union in Europe, and rapid development in 
East Asia supported the growth of a middle-class 
that led to further consolidation of legal property 
systems in these regions. The transformation from 
predominantly extralegal property systems to for-
mal property rights entrenched in law has since 
come to support functioning market economies 
and polities.
The Building Blocks of the Property 
System
This transition has reduced global poverty sub-
stantially, but as outlined above, billions of peo-
ple around the world still lack secure property 
rights, which hinders their economic, political 
and social security. In order to examine how pov-
erty can best be relieved, and why access to prop-
erty rights is fundamental to the empowerment 
of the poor, it is necessary to identify building 
blocks of a fully-functional property system. Such 
a system operates in the following four ways:
1)	As	a	system	of	rules	that	defines	the	bundle	
of	rights	and	obligations	between	people	and	
assets.15 Property ownership creates ties that 
bind individual citizens together through the 
formation of networks of economic and legal 
rights and corresponding obligations. The 
credible enforcement of these rights and ob-
ligations requires a judicial mechanism that 
allows for equitable, transparent and efficient 
dispute resolution.
2)	As	a	system	of	governance.	Property systems 
are a central facet of state functionality, and 
as such are an important measurement of fi-
duciary and administrative effectiveness. The 
institutional order of the state is based on 
technical rules and relationships which define 
interactions between stakeholders, ranging 
from direct ownership of land to promulga-
tion of rules that govern security of land and 
house tenure, land planning, zoning, taxing 
and other aspects of property management. 
Technological innovation, which has radically 
reduced the cost of information, has generated 
the possibility for further transparency and ac-
countability in property systems as an instru-
ment of governance.
3)	As	a	functioning	market	for	the	exchange	of	
assets. A fully functional property system al-
lows land, houses, moveable property, equity 
shares, and ideas to be transformed into as-
sets to be bought and sold at rates determined 
by market forces. This subjects the exchange 
of property to a level of transparency and ac-
countability, and allows for the development 
of financial mechanisms — including credit 
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and insurance — to facilitate transactions and 
improve economic outcomes. Land, houses 
and moveable property can thus be leveraged, 
and assets transformed from static invest-
ments into capital which can be bought and 
sold. However, property rights are a necessary 
but not sufficient precondition for the devel-
opment of these financial mechanisms; they 
also develop through partnership between the 
market, special funds targeted at access to 
finance, and the state.
4)	As	an	instrument	of	social	policy.	In the ab-
sence or failure of the market, the state often 
plays a direct role in addressing the needs of 
the poor. The state has at its disposal instru-
ments that can be used to endow its citizens 
with assets as they relate to property, such 
as public housing, low interest loans and the 
distribution of state land. Such instruments 
help to overcome natural competition for as-
sets. The state also supports social cohesion 
through the development of co-ownership of 
infrastructure and services by government and 
the citizen, supporting the equilibrium be-
tween individual and collective interests. Pro-
vision of infrastructure by the state critically 
affects the value and desirability of assets, 
and can therefore fundamentally affect oppor-
tunities for the poor.
Dysfunctionalities in Property 
Management
These four key building blocks can be viewed as a 
coherent framework through which to understand 
property rights. It follows that analysis of these 
blocks allows us to identify where dysfunction-
alities in property management might arise and 
where there are disconnects within key elements 
of this framework. As far as the poor are con-
cerned, they have trouble getting property in the 
first place (unfairly limited access). Where they 
have assets, their rights are often not adequately 
recognised, or enforced, or given full backing of 
the law, and are consequently vulnerable to being 
lost. Unfairly limited access to property and inse-
curity of assets are caused by dysfunctionalities 
in the property system that can be understood 
fourfold:
1)	Misalignment	of	social	practice	and	legal	
provision. Social practice and law reinforce 
each other when aligned towards common 
objectives, but when misaligned can under-
mine state legitimacy and accountability and 
weaken ties of citizenship. Law must evolve 
organically to suit the context in which it is to 
be applied and should not be perceived as the 
instrument through which a minority imposes 
its power. Legal aspects of property systems 
must grow from land practices on the ground 
and incorporate customary interactions and 
networks. There have been two common sourc-
es of misalignment. Firstly, some states, par-
ticularly during the colonial period, imposed 
property systems on vast tracts of land that 
were previously regulated through customary 
regimes of rights and obligations. The result 
was a major gap between daily practices of the 
people and requirements of formal law. Sec-
ondly, in urban areas, as de Soto has pointed 
out, ill-conceived laws have forced millions of 
people into informality, as gaining access to 
land for housing is a lengthy process, meas-
ured in terms of years if not decades.16
2)	Misuse	of	rules	governing	property.	While rules 
for property systems may be both appropri-
ate and equitable, they may still be open to 
abuse by those in power. Rules are resources 
that can be subverted to serve the interests of 
the few, through corruption and lack of trans-
parency, rather than acting as a framework 
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for empowerment of the many. Equally, land 
regulations, rather than providing a framework 
within which parameters for property manage-
ment are set and transactions enabled, can 
become mechanisms for restriction of property 
rights and bureaucratic mismanagement.
3)	Lack	of	access	to	information	and	justice.	
Even where cadastres, land registers and other 
repositories of property titles, records and 
documents exist, restriction of access to such 
information reduces the transparency and ef-
ficiency of property transactions. Governments 
must work to make information on property 
available to the general public and seek to 
collect further data and opinion in innovative 
ways through the promotion of opportunities 
for public debate on property and citizen re-
source rights, and strengthening of knowledge 
sharing and analysis on these issues. 
4)	Misuse	of	eminent	domain.	Corrupt govern-
ments can use the inherent power of the state 
to seize private property and thus confiscate 
assets of the poor in the name of the public 
good. The primary remedy against wrongful 
or unjust loss of property is a just policy of 
land acquisition and resettlement; it can in-
clude innovative approaches, such as offering 
partnerships to the poor in developing assets 
created from investment in infrastructure and 
services. International financial institutions, 
particularly the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank, moved systematically in 
this way in the 1990s to address the adverse 
impacts that developmental projects had on 
the standard of living of the poor. At the na-
tional level, however, practices differ widely 
and abuse, with regard to use of eminent do-
main (for depriving the poor of their assets), 
continues to be a problem. Reform of com-
pulsory acquisition mechanisms is necessary, 
as demonstrated most palpably in Zimbabwe 
recently, one of the few countries today which 
constitutionally permits appropriation without 
payment of any compensation.17 Review of 20 
land acquisition laws in Sub-Saharan Africa18 
indicates three sources of this type of legal 
disempowerment: (1) process of acquisition, 
wherein, for example, compensation valuing 
billions of dollars remains unpaid in some 
regions without clear avenues of redress; (2) 
the basis for compensation payment, which 
routinely fails to take into account real costs 
to the loss of land, and (3) manipulation, 
through purposeful or poorly specified defini-
tion, of what constitutes ‘public purpose’.19 
Property Rights and Legal 
Empowerment
Property rights are defined through law, and 
therefore the Legal Empowerment of the poor, as 
citizens, can only come about through the protec-
tion of those rights. However, legal status can 
have strikingly different impacts upon citizenship: 
it can become an instrument for the creation of 
opportunities for exercising rights, create entitle-
ments to rights for specific categories of people, 
or repress or deny contestation of those rights to 
others. H.L.A. Hart’s distinction between internal 
and external views of the law shown in Table 1 is 
instructive.20
Since internal actors are positioned in a hierar-chy, the extent to which legal status produces 
loyalty to the social order depends on feedback 
loops. ‘Loops’ between and among the actors af-
fect the degree of efficiency and effectiveness of 
the administrators in delivering rights or enforcing 
obligations in a manner that incorporates account-
ability. The ‘user’ perspective is essential for the 
legitimacy of the system, as legitimacy is the out-
come of the degree to which people, once granted 
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a particular legal status or set of rights, such as 
property rights, come to identify and endorse the 
social order so produced. External actors are posi-
tioned to push the frontiers of the existing social 
order by questioning the balance between solidar-
ity and inequality. They catalyse changes to exist-
ing citizenship arrangements, in questioning the 
fairness or effectiveness of an existing legal status, 
and in the creation of new legal status for specific 
groups. The creation and expansion of citizenship 
rights is a process of contestation that can lead to 
new interpretations of old laws and the promulga-
tion of new laws, or the creation of new mecha-
nisms to deal with issues that do not fit into an 
existing framework. Thus, groups that question the 
status quo can prove that the law is malleable, just 
as indigenous groups have fought for, and won, 
recognition of customary land rights in Australia or 
New Zealand.
However, the provision of property rights in law does not always guarantee equality in 
practice. While states can attempt to balance 
inequality and solidarity, discrimination and so-
cial classifications remain entrenched in many 
societies. Inequality can stem from deep-rooted 
cultural distinctions such as caste, gender and 
race, and the challenge then is to create condi-
tions for property rights not just at the legal level, 
but through mechanisms that can fundamentally 
change mental models and social practices at all 
levels of society. Even in the European Union, 
where equality of men and women is a funda-
mental axiom of policy, gender mainstreaming in 
social policy still remains a significant challenge, 
according to a recent European Commission re-
port on social inclusion.21
The degree to which an order is open or closed, to 
extending legal status to new groups or to chang-
ing the status of existing groups, is an important 
test of its capacity for coping with change. Even 
when creation of status is open in theory, mecha-
nisms are needed to create trust in the social 
order. If property rights are legally extended to 
a previously disenfranchised group, that group 
must believe that their property will not be seized 
through misuse of eminent domain.
Therefore, context-based legal reform is critical to 
governance in developing countries. There can be 
no blanket approach: expansion of property rights 
in a coherent manner requires understanding of 
trends and a tailoring of provisions to context. 
There must be a degree of coherence to laws 
based on fundamental rules, or those laws will 
not be respected. If de jure property rights do not 
correspond with de facto property practices and 
customs, the subsequent legal misalignment will 
undermine rather than strengthen the system. 
Disorder and dysfunction has its own stake-
holders, and if resources are seen as zero-sum, 
change can be perceived as highly threatening by 
entrenched interests.
Table 1 Mapping the dynamics of  legal status
External Internal
The public, social movements The authorizing environment for rule-making (Parliament, Congress, 
Cabinet Board of Corporations)
Legal community of practice Composers/Drafters (Constitutions, primary, secondary 
legislation, by-laws, manuals)
Judicial Review, civil society and media Administrators/Organisers
Excluded/ineligible people Users/citizens
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Property systems consist of a bundle of rights and 
obligations. In OECD countries, an entire series 
of legal innovations has evolved to allow for coop-
erative arrangements that underpin this dynamic 
and support transparent, effective property-based 
economies. The same type of thinking has not 
been applied to developing-country contexts to 
examine precisely how property arrangements 
could be modified, and interactions codified, in 
ways that would allow the poor to leverage their 
assets and become legitimate stakeholders in 
global property systems. Urban slums represent 
land that could be a valuable asset when con-
ceptualized in a different way as part of coherent 
urban planning strategies. Latent assets must 
be leveraged and their stakeholders — the poor 
— brought into dynamic new partnerships to 
align law and practice in ways that allow for the 
systemic expansion of property rights.
Key Elements of a Reform Strategy
This process creates both a national and global public good, and to bring it about govern-
ments of developing countries must enter into a 
double compact - with their citizens and the inter-
national community. To level the playing field for 
the poor and operate in a manner that best serves 
the interests of the disenfranchised, international 
actors must develop long-term partnerships with 
national governments on property rights as part 
of the broader economic governance agenda. A 
reform strategy for effectively functioning property 
systems that empower the poor should be based 
on land tenure security, creation of opportunity for 
investment, and adequate management of risk. 
The elements of such a strategy must:
1)	Promote	Legitimacy	by	Adequate	Participation	
and	Deliberation. In general, future reform will 
require a legitimate state. For implementa-
tion at all levels, reforms must be based on 
deliberation and inputs from those that they 
are intended to affect. This will bring focus on 
relevant issues, engender acceptance by local 
communities, and reduce the cost of reform. 
In Peru between 1996 and 2000, for example, 
3,500 meetings were held on land titling proc-
esses in different settlements around the coun-
try, helping to improve community satisfaction 
with property reform efforts.22 In particular, the 
groups outlined above - women, indigenous 
groups, and urban slum dwellers - and other 
excluded groups, must be given special atten-
tion as part of this process. Support for initia-
tives such as the establishment of coalitions 
between urban and rural poor around common 
concerns including the effects of the rural exo-
dus on rural economies and urban poverty are a 
productive starting point.23
2)	Support	Parallel	Interventions. Implementation 
of rules that underpin a functioning system for 
access to, and registration of, property, do not 
automatically create the mechanisms necessary 
to support this system. By giving attention to 
the four building blocks of the property system, 
governments must carefully plan and sequence 
the interventions that will create the corollary 
financial and legal instruments that underpin 
effective property rights and facilitate access 
to managerial ability, technology, credit, and 
markets for new property owners to become 
competitive. The evolution of efficient financial 
markets will depend on the ability to use land, 
and other property, as collateral. In developed 
countries, more than two thirds of small busi-
ness loans are secured against land and real 
estate. Experience in South Africa and Brazil 
demonstrates that unconventional avenues 
(e.g. partnerships and joint ventures with old 
land owners) may be a useful first step. Gov-
ernments should also develop methods for in-
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creasing finance for land reform and post-land 
acquisition services, including land banks, 
land-for-debt schemes and land for taxes.24
3)	Facilitate	Private	Sector	Involvement.	The 
state needs to set the parameters within which 
private sector investment can take place, and 
remove any disincentives to this process. Fees 
for property transactions, which in some devel-
oping countries can be as high as 30 percent, 
act as an unnecessary form of taxation that 
inhibits the free exchange of land through 
market mechanisms and excludes the poor. 
Official land taxes must also be set at an af-
fordable level for the poor and subsidies and 
tax provisions that provide distorting privileges 
to large-scale farmers should be removed. In 
Mexico, for example, certain groups ‘prefer not 
to regularise the land for human settlement 
to evade having to paying land tax, which pro-
motes informality in land markets.’25 Invest-
ment climate surveys indicate that access to 
land was the main obstacle to conducting and 
expanding business by 57 percent of the en-
terprises interviewed in Ethiopia, 35 percent 
in Bangladesh and 25 percent in Tanzania and 
Kenya.
4)	Promote	Property	Rights	through	Individual	
and	Corporate	Ownership.	Property law should 
offer clear and simple options of legal per-
sonality and corporate ownership for small 
businesses and corporative associations of the 
poor. Legal personality so designed opens up 
a wide range of possibilities of ownership by 
human individuals, by members of collectives, 
and by collectives. Pro-poor property rights sys-
tems facilitate the ability of people to pool and 
leverage modest resources and limit liabilities 
in case of business failure or exit of partners. 
One of the keys to economic success of small 
entrepreneurs in the developing world is the 
limited liability of business owners, thus offer-
ing the possibility of controlled failure without 
disastrous economic consequences for the 
vulnerable individuals involved. This legal in-
strument of limited corporate liability has to be 
extended to the poor micro-entrepreneurs and 
rural producers. It constitutes one of the main 
advantages of formality of corporate ownership 
and can trump unavoidable disadvantages.
5)	Create	Systems	for	Collateralising	Moveable	
and	Intangible	Property. Although many of the 
citizens of the developing world lack secure 
rights to use and transfer real property, most 
of them own some tangible (moveable) or in-
tangible property.26 To the extent that this type 
of property is held securely and can be used to 
access credit and to create and grow business-
es, the poor will have increased opportunities. 
Experience in a variety of developing countries 
(Georgia, Madagascar, Colombia, Albania, Bos-
nia among them) suggests that there are im-
portant legal reforms that would allow the poor 
to leverage movable and intangible property.
6)	Co-management	of	Natural	Resources.	The ma-
jority of the rural poor depend to a large extent 
on non-arable resources such as forests, pas-
tures, swamplands, and fishing grounds. These 
resources require careful management to avoid 
rent-seeking and corrupt practices that result 
in environmental degradation and economic 
inefficiencies. The state should enhance the 
asset base of the poor by enabling community-
based ownership and management of private 
commons, but it will have to play the role of 
conflict manager among the communities and 
among individuals. In the case of fossil energy 
resources requiring capital intensive extraction, 
treatment and distribution, the state should 
utilise transparent and fair auction procedures 
when involving the private sector, linked to 
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conditionality of local community develop-
ment. These procedures could be regulated 
and implemented on the basis of multilateral 
charters.27 In the case of state co-ownership 
of fossil energy reserves, the local populations 
should be included in the chain of value addi-
tion by tradable shares in general public funds. 
Distributing among the poor shares or other 
forms of ownership participation in state owned 
companies that exploit the natural resources 
will provide them with capital that, inter alia, 
can propel the expansion of small businesses. 
Another option is distributing titles to special 
funds created by governments to invest profits 
yielded by commodities.28
7)	Utilise	Modern	Technology.	Manual systems 
of land registration are highly labour intensive 
and lead to significant error and duplication. 
Moreover, the costs of manual land survey and 
registration processes are often prohibitive. 
Recent advances in technology, including the 
widespread availability of satellite imagery 
and handheld GPS devices, together with in-
stitutional arrangements that put local actors 
in charge of systematic adjudication, can sig-
nificantly reduce the cost and effort of issuing 
land registration documents. Moreover, mod-
ern technology can help to improve transpar-
ency and at the same time make land admin-
istration more accessible.29 There are caveats 
to this process, identified in the report. 
Based on these principles, developing country governments, supported by the international 
community, must devise a series of innovative, 
pro-poor land reform policies that are distinctly 
focused on ensuring that more of the benefits of 
property systems accrue to those at the very bot-
tom of the economic ladder. A careful stocktaking 
of such efforts already underway in various parts 
of the world, including analysis of conditions that 
gave rise to such efforts, and possibilities for their 
expansion, will be instructive. We can develop 
transitional reform mechanisms from experience 
in the Philippines, for example, where the national 
government employs intermediate instruments of 
land tenure, such as land proclamations, to as-
sure the poor that they will not be evicted from 
land they occupy, and that social services will be 
improved while plot ownership is formalised.30 
Or we consider how the South African experience 
with Mzansi accounts, providing low-fee banking 
for poor people working in the informal sector, 
could be replicated elsewhere.31 Modalities exist to 
empower the poor through property rights, but we 
must now scale up and catalyse them.
Conclusion
Legal Empowerment of the Poor through property 
rights requires sustained efforts. Property systems 
that exclude large segments of the global popula-
tion from property rights have to be discontinued 
and we must expand the zone of legitimate land 
tenure through improved access and security. 
Developing country governments must enter into 
a compact with their own citizens and with the 
international community to support this reform. 
The aid community understands that property 
rights must be a central tenet of any efforts to 
reduce poverty, and allocates funding on this 
basis. Today, the key challenge is to consolidate 
thinking and draw good practice from effective 
interventions to date to improve pro-poor out-
comes, develop effective land management insti-
tutions, establish clear rules for the management 
of public land, and strengthen the institutional 
framework and mechanisms for land transfer and 
access. Property rights are too central to human 
dignity and prosperity for current thinking and 
practice to continue. Only with empowerment 
through property rights can we truly seek to re-
duce global poverty and reduce inequality.
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I. Introduction
As these lines are being written, close to 30,000 of India’s roughly 170 million lan-
dless people are marching peacefully to Delhi 
on the highway. They demand not to be driven 
off their land just because it was declared state 
property; they demand property documents or the 
formal registration of documents in their posses-
sion; they demanded that unused state land be 
allocated to them, and they demand state pro-
tection against violent guerrilla movements. The 
fulfilment of these demands, and the solution to 
many other property-related problems identified 
in this report, requires strong, sustained and con-
text-based reform. Such reform has to be founded 
in political will and the associational power of the 
poor, exemplified by the marchers in India.
Legal Empowerment of the Poor is a framework 
of action which takes such demands seriously. 
It recommends the promotion of domestic legal 
and administrative frameworks providing the poor 
opportunities to use their talents and to trans-
form their impressive economic efforts into an 
increased and secured asset base. The agenda 
implies a general reform of the law from an in-
strument of domination into a system of effective 
protections and opportunities for the poor.32
On the input side, the emphasis of legal empow-
erment is placed on participatory and account-
able forms of law-making and public adminis-
tration, giving voice to the poor and increased 
ownership of the framing of their legal and social 
environment. Regarding the means, legal em-
powerment stresses the critical importance of 
the following: granting legal identity and access 
to justice to all human persons, small business 
corporations, and civil society associations (see 
Chapter 1 of this report); securing property rights 
of the poor as asset holders through comprehen-
sive and context-based property rights systems; 
protecting the poor as workers (see Chapter 3),  
and creating an enabling business environment 
for small entrepreneurs and the self-employed 
(Chapter 4). On the output side, a result-oriented 
legal empowerment agenda stresses effective 
protection of livelihoods of the poor and, more 
originally, measurable creation of new opportuni-
ties for diversifying livelihoods, thereby improving 
lives. Escape from the poverty trap and creating a 
more decent life are seen as the principal aims.
Property rights stand for the bundle of liberties and claim rights tied to the allocation of a 
resource to a natural or legal person, corporation, 
collectivity, association, etc. The concept of prop-
erty rights as human rights and as part of Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor implies two agendas: 
legally enforced protection of the assets of the 
poor, and general promotion of access to property 
by the poor.
Through sustainable ownership and/or security 
of tenure33 individuals and communities become 
more autonomous. Even with modest assets, as 
holders of property rights, individuals and groups 
become more active as independent members of 
their communities and nations. Private property 
rights allow people to pool their assets into trans-
parent structures of co-ownership with fair exit 
options. This is critical for the poor who have very 
few assets but who can achieve social and eco-
nomic leverage by pooling assets into legally rec-
ognised common or community property. Reliable 
and equitable property rights systems help set-
tle competing property claims and facilitate the 
identification of responsibilities and liabilities. 
The increased social stability and trust emanating 
from robust property rights systems create appro-
priate environments for business and investment. 
Secure rights to use and trade property provide 
strong incentives to maintain and conserve re-
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sources. Individuals and groups with such rights 
tend to invest in the resources they hold. In gen-
eral, property rights give people a horizon to plan 
the future for themselves and their communities.
Structure and Goal of this Chapter
None of the above-mentioned benefits can be 
achieved easily with one-size-fits-all models. This 
chapter elaborates the main features of reform 
with a special but non-exclusive emphasis on 
the poor. Section 2 identifies the most vulner-
able segments of society and the relation of their 
poverty and exclusion to the problem of property 
rights protection. Section 3 briefly assesses the 
barriers and facilitators of change, drawing atten-
tion to social actors as well as structural condi-
tions favouring status quo or change, while Sec-
tion 4 contains a concise compilation of lessons 
and experienced consequences of past reform 
activities, and prepares the ground for the main 
discussion, in Section 5, on proposals within the 
four building blocks of the property system. The 
proposals aim at reforming the property system 
(viewed as an arrangement of rules defining or 
enabling bundles and bearers of property rights) 
in such a manner that it would enable the poor 
— especially women and indigenous communi-
ties — to access and to secure property. The sug-
gestions should also help to reform the property 
system so it could serve as a form of governance, 
as a functioning market of assets (including the 
poor in the chains of value addition), and as a 
system of social policy with targeted measures 
of capacity building and access to property and 
housing.
Parallel reform work, sustained by constant monitoring in all four dimensions, is advo-
cated in order to achieve real progress. Common 
formal features of policy design and prioritising 
are dealt with in a special paragraph of Section 
5. The establishment of fully functional property 
systems and positive effects for the poor is first 
and foremost a national and local reform issue 
demanding the renegotiation of institutional, le-
gal, and social relations at the national and local 
level. However, an additional section of this re-
port also points to important subsidiary and sta-
bilising action by donor countries and multilateral 
arrangements.
This chapter deals with the most general features 
of pro-poor property reform and is thus not to be 
read as  a national or local implementation report. 
It builds, however, on lessons and practices that 
have proven beneficial in many different contexts 
and that have been highlighted in numerous na-
tional and grass roots consultations of the CLEP. 
Our recommendations, therefore, deserve to be 
seriously considered and further tailored to lo-
cal-reality context by property rights reform in the 
developing world.
Although not repeatedly mentioned throughout 
this chapter, the members of our working group 
acknowledge the efforts of numerous govern-
ments, international organisations, and NGOs in 
the field of property rights. And as many mem-
bers are themselves part of past and ongoing ef-
forts in the field, our chapter was not written with 
any pretension to invent a ‘wheel’. The intent is 
that it would serve to raise political awareness 
and communicate a set of selected policy options 
for decision makers in the hope of improving sub-
stantially equitable property rights protection for 
the poor and societies at large. The general treat-
ment of such a sensitive and context-dependent 
issue implies an inevitable trade-off between sim-
plicity and comprehensiveness.
It should be noted at the outset that the chair, 
rapporteur and contributors to this chapter 
(named at the beginning of this volume) have all 
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contributed to its substance. But as drafted and 
synthesised by the rapporteur, the content might 
not always represent all the viewpoints and priori-
ties. Positions taken should thus not be directly 
attributed to all contributors — some positions, 
in fact, remain controversial among them. There 
are two general points in relation to which the 
contributors voiced conflicting views to the rap-
porteur: the first concerns the role of the state; 
the second, the role of the market. While some 
see the state as an indispensable part of the so-
lution to the problem of faltering property rights 
for the poor, others emphasise that it is rather 
part of the problem or even the root cause. And, 
while some see the market as an opportunity for 
the poor to work themselves out of poverty, others 
stress the fact that market forces marginalize the 
poor and drive them into misery.
A closer look reveals that these diagnostic view points are often context-dependent. To 
realise property rights for the poor, both the state 
as enabler and lender of last resort in regulation 
and rule implementation, as well as the market 
as prime producer of resources, need close at-
tention. Both state and market have indeed been 
neglecting or harming the poor, but in the fight 
against poverty there is no alternative to the 
dynamic relation between a reformed and more 
legitimate state and a functional market that in-
cludes the poor in the value chains. This chapter 
therefore stresses the dynamic interdependence 
of state and market and the equal importance 
of their reform in the efforts to empower the 
poor through property rights. There is consensus 
among the members of the working group which 
prepared this chapter that the state as such 
should not be the default owner of land property 
and natural resources. The state is, however, in-
dispensable as regulator, enabler, and auctioneer 
of equitable property relations. Increasing the 
legitimacy of the state thus belongs at the centre 
of the national and multilateral agenda of prop-
erty rights protection.
Realisation of property rights is about creating a 
positive feedback loop between the functionality 
of property governance by the state on the one 
side, and the meaning this systemic functionality 
has for the people in their everyday life and cus-
toms. Importantly, neither of these two elements 
is to be understood as rigid and unchangeable.34 
Culture and customs are subject to constant 
change due to urbanisation, population growth, 
migration, social differentiation, technological 
development, etc., and so are the state’s insti-
tutional rules and formal procedures. If property 
rights are to bring substantial benefits to the glo-
bal poor, the formalised property systems of poor 
countries and the social practices have to evolve 
together and in response to each other.
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2. Faltering Property Rights: 
the Nature and Scale of  the 
Problem
Absence, unjust allocation, or insecurity of prop-
erty rights harm the poor and hinder sustainable 
development of a society.35 Faltering property 
rights protection is related to the disenfranchise-
ment of billions of poor people. In many cases, 
the inappropriate property rights system is the 
immediate cause of continued social, economic, 
and political disenfranchisement. This section 
will highlight the most critical areas as well as 
the most vulnerable groups of people affected by 
the dire consequences of the absence or dysfunc-
tion of property rights protection.
Growing Slums and Legal Voids
At least a third of the world’s poor live in irregu-
lar settlements without coherent legal protection 
of their assets. Population and urban settlement 
growth projections predict an aggravation of the 
problem. The UN Human Settlements Programme 
holds that over the next 25 years more than 2 
billion urban dwellers could be added to the close 
to 1 billion now living in slums, with some 2.825 
billion requiring housing and urban services by 
2030. If no action is taken most of this growth 
will occur outside the legally protected sector.37 
The consequences of the exclusion of the poor as 
a result of rapid urbanisation and modernisation 
are being acutely manifested around the world. In 
the final analysis, among all the causal factors for 
displacement, first and foremost is lack of securi-
ty of tenure for the poor, who have no enforceable 
property rights or access to justice. 
Dire Consequences and Missed Development 
Opportunities
Without enforceable property rights, residents of 
informal settlements are often subject to forceful 
eviction. They must fend for themselves or pay 
bribes to local landlords to defend their right to 
occupy land, protect it from harmful encroach-
ment, and settle disputes. Lack of protection, 
of tenure and of legal leverage for economic 
activity, decreases productivity. It leads to social 
exclusion, reproduced over generations and vis-
ible in the spatial segregation of the poor in the 
urban housing environment. Environmental and 
behavioural degradation is closely linked to the 
vicious circles perpetuated by faltering property 
rights systems which fail the poor and slow down 
the development of society at large. Residents in 
extra-legal settlements have no legitimate way to 
transfer a home to a family member or heir nor to 
rent or sell to another. Illegal black land markets 
emerge and abusive practices become prevalent. 
Due to a lack of property rights guarantee, many 
assets in developing nations are not fungible. The 
poor and their potential business partners have 
no criteria to establish or realise the potential of 
their assets. There is no clear reciprocity for hold-
ing each other accountable and no sufficient ba-
Box 1  The world’s poor:  
a demographic note
Globally 53 percent of the population is defined as 
poor by the ‘living under US$2 a day standard’ or  
3.4 billion people. The poor live in mainly six regions 
and particularly three: South Central Asia (which 
includes populous India), the even more populous 
China, and Sub-Saharan Africa. They represent the 
majority in South Central Asia (75 %) and Sub-Sa-
haran Africa (75 %) and just under half of all Chi-
nese (47 %). Together the poor in these three zones 
comprise 70 percent of the global poor.36
77
sis to protect transactions or to pool assets with 
others. For the national economy, extra-legality 
sets off a cycle of disinvestment in housing; it 
represents a lost opportunity to stimulate produc-
tive economic activity.
Rural Poverty and Property Rights
Despite continuing urbanisation, two-thirds of the poor live in rural areas. Ninety-five 
percent live in China, South Central Asia and Sub 
Saharan Africa. Together these rural poor account 
for around half the world’s total poor.
Rural Land Relations and Extreme Poverty
Insufficient land to live on, and insecure access 
or rights over land, are well recognised factors in 
sustaining poverty.38 Rural landlessness is often 
the best predictor of extreme poverty and hunger. 
Inadequate rights regarding land often result in 
entrenched poverty and are significant impedi-
ments to rural development and to alleviation of 
hunger.39 Elimination of the causes of tenure in-
security is thus imperative for fighting poverty. 
Rural Land Relations and Armed Conflict
Conflict over rural land ownership and access 
is almost always near the centre of armed civil 
conflict.40 With various degrees of prominence, 
war over land access has been a driver, such as 
between the land rights of farmers and pastoral-
ists (Burkina Faso), citizens and strangers (Côte 
d’Ivoire), indigenous and proto-colonial groups 
(Namibia, Liberia, Mozambique), and ethnic 
groups (Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Uganda). Es-
sentially, it is about conflicts of interest — and 
legal rights — between the rural rich and rural 
poor. Not surprisingly, attention to the legal 
rights of the majority of poor is often an early 
platform of post-conflict reforms, most recently 
in Sudan and Liberia,41 quite aside from the 
need to address conflict-induced land losses and 
occupations.42
Natural Resources
Land is not the only aspect of rural property dis-
order. The majority of rural poor depend upon 
forests, pastures and swamplands. Forests alone 
account for 3.8 billion hectares, of which one 
billion grow in Asia and Africa, the two poor-
est regions.43 Issues of who legally owns these 
resources, the land on which they grow, and to 
whom the rental (concession) and product values 
accrue is an urgent concern of the rural poor.44  
As the tenure and benefit share of foreshore and 
seedbed resources, fish-rich swamplands and 
(especially near-surface) minerals all deliver mil-
lions of dollars annually to non-customary owners 
and, notably, to governments, there are ownership 
issues to be considered.
The importance of water rights and their relation 
to land rights is likely to increase. Already today, 
close to one third of the world’s population suffer 
from moderate to high water shortage. The World 
Commission on Water estimates that the demand 
for water will increase by around 50 percent in 
the next 30 years and that around 4 billion people 
will live in severe conditions of water shortage by 
2025.45 Increased pressure on water resources is 
a result of population increase as well as economic 
growth. The value of land and real property often 
depends directly on the existence of adequate wa-
ter rights. In this situation property rights defining 
who has access to water will play a key role. Deci-
sions about water rights will become increasingly 
important with direct impact on rights and oppor-
tunities concerning the use of land.46
Women Especially Affected
Women own less than 10 percent of the world’s 
property:47 They constitute half the world’s popu-
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lation, they produce between 60 and 80 percent 
of the food in developing countries, and they are 
responsible for rural households in increasing 
numbers. Much of the misery in the developing 
world is due to statutory and customary property 
systems which disenfranchise women.48 Where 
women have property rights, they often come 
in ‘thin bundles’ as compared with men.49 Too 
frequently women face barriers to owning, using, 
and transferring or inheriting property. Women 
face forcible eviction from their homes and their 
land (over which they had customary or other 
rights) by family members, traditional authorities 
and/or neighbours.50 Property grabbing exacer-
bates urbanisation trends, sending more women 
to informal settlements and slums from urban 
areas. The problem is intertwined with that of 
inheritance, as many widows are evicted from 
land and property. Barriers exist de jure if stat-
utes or regulations prohibit women from using, 
owing, or inheriting property. Enacting formal 
laws that provide a woman with property rights 
does not necessarily mean that she will be able to 
exercise her rights. Often, barriers to the exercise 
of property rights are found to exist de facto, in 
consequence of poor enforcement of formal rights 
or of social norms.
Creating enforceable property rights is es-sential to empower women in both rural 
and urban settings.51 Women who own property 
or otherwise control assets directly gain from 
such benefits as use of the land and higher in-
comes as well as having a secure place to live.52 
Empowering women with property rights does a 
great deal to alleviate poverty and malnutrition, 
as women who earn more spend a higher propor-
tion of their income to keep their children healthy 
and well-fed.53 Providing women with the right to 
use, own, and transfer moveable and immovable 
property is important to promote entrepreneurial 
activity and to provide women with a platform for 
building strong families and strong businesses.
Indigenous People
Definition of Indigenous Peoples Has Yet to Reach 
Satisfactory Maturation: Indigenous peoples 
distinguish themselves by being historically, so-
cially, economically, institutionally and politically 
marginalized. That they are usually54 a minority 
Table 2  The rural poor in the poorest regions of  the world  
(Population figures in millions)
Poorest Regions  
of the World**
Total 
Population 
2005
Percent 
defined 
as poor*
Number of 
poor 2005
Percent in 
rural areas
Est. number of 
rural poor
Sub Saharan Africa 752 75 564 66 372
South Central Asia 1615 75 1211 70 848
China 1304 47 613 63 386
North Africa 194 29 56 53   30
Latin America and Caribbean 559 26 145 24   35
Eastern Europe 297 14 42 32   13
4,721 56 2,631 64 1,684
 
* Excludes Europe, Oceania, North America, etc. 
** The Population Reference Bureau uses the internationally-recognised criterion of living on less than $2 a day as the measure of poverty.
79
in their countries is added reason to take special 
steps to ensure that their interests are not ignored. 
Indigenous peoples are generally described as 
numbering around 300-370 million people within 
up to 5,000 distinctive groups. In June 2006, the 
UN Human Rights Council adopted The Declara-
tion on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, drafting 
of which had begun in the 1980s. The definition 
of indigenous peoples has seen repeated amend-
ment55 and remains contested, particularly on the 
African continent. This was a factor in the failure 
of the Declaration to meet UN General Assembly 
approval in November 2006.
Focus on Indigenous Tenure Systems 
Many indigenous lands have been and still are 
declared public or unoccupied because they are 
held collectively according to conceptions of 
ownership and access that do not fit well with 
imported property systems. This lack of status 
has consequences for indigenous asset holders 
and society at large and is a critical issue, glo-
bally, for property rights reform. In addressing 
problems of land issues of indigenous peoples 
around the world, it is advantageous to focus 
upon indigenous land tenure systems rather than 
on the identification of indigenous people per se. 
This sidesteps the troubled definition as to who 
is and who is not ‘indigenous’ and has the added 
advantage of zeroing in on the systemic issues of 
indigenous or customary tenure regimes.
Where ethnic and indigenous minorities are identified and territorially placed, it may 
be unnecessary to belabour distinctions between 
the indigenous and their tenure systems. In such 
cases, it is advisable to simply promote their 
territorial autonomy and sovereignty. It should 
include their stewardship over natural resources, 
and extend to matters of property — and all with 
outside intervention kept to a minimum. Focus on 
indigenous or customary tenure systems is critical 
in the two regions where the poor are most nu-
merous — Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia 
— and where delimitation and identification of 
indigenous peoples is difficult and contested.
Important Numbers of Customary Land Holders
Customary land holders comprise roughly two bil-
lion people in Africa, South East and South Cen-
tral Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Given that around 80 percent of these rural dwell-
ers are defined as ‘poor’ — i.e., living on  
Table 3 Main Regions Where Customary Land Tenure Operates
(Population figures are in millions)
Regions
Population 
2005
percent 
Rural 
Number 
Rural
percent 
defined 
as poor*
Number 
of poor 
2005
Number of 
rural poor
Sub Saharan Africa 752 66 496 75 564 372
North Africa 194 53 103 29 56   30
South Central Asia 1615 70 1130 75 1211 848
South East Asia 557 62 345 56 312 345
Latin America and Caribbean 559 24 134 26 145   35
3,677 60 2,208 71 2,288 1,630
Source of base figures: Population Census Bureau, 2005.56
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under US$2 a day standard — then 1.6 billion 
people may be defined as ‘the customary poor’.
Refugees, Internally Displaced 
Persons
The disorder of property relations created by internal or interstate conflict deserves spe-
cial attention.57 Putting property relations back 
in order or providing adequate compensation to 
victims is at the heart of sustainable peace build-
ing.58 The situation becomes more dramatic when 
natural disasters strike. In recent memory, the 
numbers displaced by the three major disasters 
since the end of 2004 (the tsunamis of 26 De-
cember 2004, Hurricane Katrina of 29 August 
2005, and the earthquake of 8 October 2005 in 
northern Pakistan and adjoining areas in India 
and Afghanistan), is around 2 million, according 
to the Representative of the UN Secretary-Gen-
eral on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons.59 Given the fact of global warming, and 
the increasing number of natural disasters, the 
number of displaced persons falling into un-
certain property relations is likely to grow. Also, 
empowerment of the poor through property rights 
has to be seen as most urgent for orderly rees-
tablishment of property relations after disasters 
and for the development of reliable insurance 
schemes.60 Hurricane Katrina victims had prop-
erty rights and insurance schemes that mitigated 
their losses. The poorest people of the world lack 
and desperately need such securities.
3. Barriers versus 
Facilitators of  Change 
There is evidence of enormous social and eco-
nomic potential in the establishment of property 
rights systems for all societies.61 This insight 
leads to the question as to what actors and struc-
tural barriers prevent societies from adopting gen-
erally beneficial property rights systems and what 
can be done to overcome these barriers.
Resistance of Powerful Social 
Actors
Private owners of illegally occupied property 
often resist allocating land to squatters against 
market value compensation.62 Some business 
actors profiting from monopoly-like positions want 
to avoid competition. They resist legalisation 
and undermine good governance.63 Lawyers and 
notaries profit from the complexity of legal prop-
erty systems excluding the poor.64 State officials 
profit from bureaucratic complexity of the system 
through gatekeeping and briberies. Entrepreneurs 
in the informal sector refrain from registering 
businesses and property to avoid taxes and costly 
regulations.65
Structural Obstacles and 
Facilitators of Change
Actors tackling the task of reform also have to 
be aware of structural causes of stagnation or 
change. The distribution of power plays an im-
portant role in determining the likelihood of the 
emergence of fair property rights systems. Land 
and income distribution is another factor in this 
regard. Indeed, it has been shown that the nature 
of the prevailing political regime and land and 
income inequality are important determinants of 
property rights structure.66 When political power 
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is concentrated in the hands of the few, and/or 
land and income distribution is skewed result-
ing in extreme inequality, political authorities are 
unlikely to implement and enforce property rights 
in an equitable manner.67 This indicates that the 
evolution of property rights systems is to a large 
extent determined by historical conditions, such 
as the distribution of factors of production.68
Realising Turnaround
Understanding the likely impact of reforms on non-poor groups with significant influence 
is critical to assess potential support and opposi-
tion for reforms.69 Besides promoting pro-poor 
property rights it is therefore important to estab-
lish property rights systems that are beneficial 
for middle classes and groups with significant 
assets and political influence. The message to all 
is that in the absence of generalised and equi-
table property rights systems much of economic 
activity does not develop its full potential even 
for powerful actors70; there is a high likelihood of 
social unrest71; there may be under-accumulation 
of human capital resulting in a low quality labour 
force, and little demand for credit resulting in un-
derdeveloped financial institutions and ultimately 
hindered growth. There is also less foreign invest-
ment or flight of capital when property rights are 
not guaranteed.
Provided that inequalities are not too extreme, 
equitable property rights may emerge precisely 
because of their beneficial consequences for 
groups with significant assets and political influ-
ence. They may also emerge out of the desire 
of elites to avoid adverse consequences from 
exceeding numbers of poor people not having 
access to property rights.72 Indeed, several re-
cent examples in Asia, where political leaders 
induced progressive reforms, including equitable 
property rights, are illustrative of precisely this 
scenario. The emergence of property rights and 
the distribution of resources may have mutual 
causal effect.73 Examples of countries like China 
and Singapore teach us that an alternative route 
of political authorities consenting to reforms is 
a possibility where inequalities are less extreme. 
The issue of better understanding how to devise 
mechanisms for convincing the political authori-
ties or circumventing their influence in order 
to induce the reform constitutes an important 
challenge. An important implication of this view 
is that a drastic one-time reform may have long 
lasting consequences, setting the process of ever 
improving distribution along side with more equi-
table property rights systems.
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4. Learning from the Past
Learning from previous reforms in view of improving 
practices carries considerable burdens of judgment 
as one tries to measure the possible applicability 
of particular lessons to future reforms in very dif-
ferent contexts. What is provided in this section is 
a compressed selection of lessons to give actors on 
the ground better conditions to reach their own in-
formed judgment.
Problematic Practices and Omissions
Six general lessons from past mistakes are 
presented as follows:   
1)  Disregarding that effective property rights for 
the poor are the result of power relations and 
systemic interaction. Many efforts to give the 
poor effective and enforceable property rights 
have focused on necessary technical and le-
gal issues at the expense of paying attention 
to how power relations influence the property 
rights system in its impact on the most vulner-
able members of society. This has hindered 
effective realisation of theoretically anticipat-
ed reform benefits for the poor. Associational 
power of the poor, more symmetric informa-
tion, legal literacy, procedural assistance and 
institutional capacity building are as important 
as the formal legal instruments of property 
rights.74
2) Failing to assess the credit market environ-
ment of the property system and assuming 
that credit markets will evolve automatically 
from property rights. In general, rates of mort-
gaging remain very low in developing coun-
tries, partly due to low demand, partly due to 
availability of less risky alternative sources of 
loans than possible foreclosure threatens and 
in the past partly due to low values in a mar-
ket.75 Given the reluctance of banks to destroy 
the entire livelihood of a poor family in the 
event of foreclosure and the likelihood of local 
resistance to attempts to take or sell off the 
collateralised property, there is limited access 
to mortgages and credit, especially in rural 
areas.76 Understanding the role of credit mar-
kets in relation to property rights formalisation 
has led to some important shifts in donor land 
policies in recent years. It is now accepted 
that for markets to move land and real proper-
ty to the poor in a sustainable manner targeted 
credit must be provided.
3) Assuming that the state is strong and trustwor-
thy and that therefore property titles and reg-
istries as well as the guarantee of transactions 
are reliable and corruption proof.77 In many 
countries land administration is one of the 
most corrupt public services. The most egre-
gious examples include irregularities and out-
right fraud in allocating and managing public 
lands. Even petty corruption in regular service 
delivery can involve large sums and have far-
reaching economic consequences.78
4) Failure to include moveable property and 
shareholder schemes of ownership and value 
addition in policies promoting property rights. 
The asset base of the poor can be extended by 
innovative forms of non-real estate and non-
credit based corporate shareholder ownership 
and by using moveable property as collateral. 
Unlike land and housing, the reproductive 
potential of non-tangible forms of property is 
potentially unlimited. 
5) Repressing Opportunities alongside with Risk. 
Even a moderate increase in the liberties and 
entitlements that come with private property, 
be it owned by individuals or groups, can often 
create considerable benefits.79 Thin bundles 
of property rights, reducing the fungibility of 
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property, contribute to the exclusion of the poor 
from the chain of value addition in case of land 
development, compensation payments, and 
general increase of property value. The risks 
of the land and financial market have invited 
special policy measures which are supposed 
to protect the poor from predators and harmful 
market forces. Such practices mainly include 
conditionality of forming collectives in order 
to register property under a single legal entity, 
restrictions on the right to transfer (moratoria) 
after land privatisation or titling, quantitative 
ceilings of ownership, special qualification to 
profit from land and real estate redistribution. 
The incentives to form collectives are ben-
eficial where they are related to and protect 
existing communal structures.80 They are often 
dysfunctional in contexts where a majority or a 
very active minority of people wants to act as 
individuals or small family groups and where 
the moratoria are too long and time is not 
used for capacity building.81
6) Failure to conceive gender equitable property 
rights systems. In many countries, formal 
statutory law operates in conjunction with cus-
tomary law and cultural norms and practices 
based on patriarchal attitudes which make 
it difficult to enforce women’s legal rights to 
land as wives and daughters. Individualistic 
statutory law favouring the male household 
head and customary practices and hierarchies 
combine into a mix that is harmful for women. 
Where customary law and more gender con-
science statutory law conflict, oftentimes the 
customary law trumps. In some instances 
statutory law has erased customary practices 
favouring widows or women in general. Legal 
reform does not improve the precarious prop-
erty rights situation of women if there are no 
enforcement mechanisms, and if legal assist-
ance and support services are not affordable 
or accessible for women.82
Lessons from mistakes related to land and real 
property:
1) Failure to address the problem of landless-
ness and extremely unequal land distribution. 
Market based reforms are not the definite 
solution to this problem, but land purchase 
and redistribution of underused land by the 
state, multilateral donors or land-banks by 
private foundations can avoid the social unrest 
and withdrawal of private investment usually 
caused by compulsory acquisition and expro-
priation.83
2) Retaining that customary tenure and interests 
in commons does not represent private property 
rights in and of themselves and are therefore 
not eligible for registration without conversion 
into imported forms.84 Sustaining versions of 
collective assets in particular as ‘un-owned 
land’ or default state-owned, instead of regis-
tering these as the private, group-owned proper-
ty of communities has deprived millions of poor 
of a secure asset and income base. Customary 
tenure systems were thought to provide insuf-
ficient tenure security. They were assumed to 
impede farmers from making necessary invest-
ments in land and they were associated with 
the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ 85 Research has 
shown that such systems can be effective. By 
default and notwithstanding important quali-
fications, customary tenure systems are to be 
considered as providing an adequate framework 
for private group-owned property. They have 
been flexible and responsive to changing eco-
nomic circumstances.86 They limit the property 
rights bundle to a specific group of people as 
the bearers of those rights. The household, the 
village, and the kin group often provide insur-
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ance against risks, access to informal credit, 
and security. Lineage rules of inheritance help 
enforce intergenerational transfers. The threat 
of social exclusion is a major instrument of 
enforcement of the rules. In other words, es-
sential functions of the property rights system 
are fulfilled by customary systems and ought to 
be legally reinforced.87
3) Assuming high demand for formal entitlement, 
i.e. assuming that rural and remote landhold-
ers felt their rights to their house and farm 
plots are threatened or that they explicitly 
want to raise loans on the basis of formal titles 
to these assets.88 Paying insufficient atten-
tion to the time and financial costs of titling, 
to both government and landholder.89 In par-
ticular assuming that titling always has to be 
cadastre-based and rest upon expensive survey 
and mapping.90 
4) Assuming that titling is the precondition for 
property security when other measures offer 
more immediate and simpler ways of securing 
the assets of the poor, especially in remote ru-
ral areas. Even in rural African contexts, where 
individual titling of land may not be desirable 
or feasible and the use of land as collateral for 
credit is only a remote possibility, providing 
poor land owners or users with documented 
rights can yield significant benefits.91
5) Failing to pay attention to pro-poor land mar-
ket development and failing to assess the im-
pact of the land market on the poor.92
6) Failure to Simplify Land Administration for 
the Least Advantaged Customer. In many 
countries, land administration functions are 
dispersed among many Ministries (justice, 
environment, agriculture, urban, finance, land 
reform, forest, mining, etc.). This creates 
grey zones of overlapping competencies as a 
breeding ground for non-transparent practices. 
Even if responsibilities are clearly assigned 
and overlaps avoided, this creates confusion 
among users, prevents realisation of econo-
mies of scale, and thus increases the cost of 
providing land administration services to the 
detriment of the poor.93
7) Failing to Restrict Eminent Domain. There 
should be a strict focus on using eminent 
domain as ultima ratio in providing essential 
public services rather than as a means to 
improve general public utility. The latter pro-
motes illegitimate alliances of state ownership 
and powerful particular interest and severely 
damages the property rights of marginal land 
users by excluding them from adequate com-
pensation or inclusion in chains of value addi-
tion through property development.
8) Insufficient Revenue Sharing in Gains from 
Natural Resources. There has been lack of at-
tention to the possibility of community based 
natural resource management in the case of 
forests, fishery, and water. There has been 
insufficient participation of citizens in the 
revenues from the extraction, treatment, and 
distribution of natural resources.
Experienced Consequences
1)  Enduring extra-legality of the majority of asset 
holders despite existing property systems and 
titling programmes is a persisting phenom-
enon. It is due to imperfect implementation 
in some cases but in many other settings it is 
the result of a mismatch of official institutions 
and local practices.
2)  Disruption of Existing Tenurial Arrangements. 
Careless implementation of formal documen-
tation may have the effect of inadvertently 
disrupting existing tenurial arrangements. 
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There may be sound policy reasons for seeking 
to modify or eliminate some existing tenurial 
practices. It is important, however, that any 
such reforms are the result of informed and 
participatory decision-making, and not the 
inadvertent result of poorly designed or imple-
mented titling processes.
3)  Concentration and Discrimination. In many 
countries, including the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, it has been observed that some 
people may be less well positioned to partici-
pate effectively in the documentation and regis-
tration process than others, with the effect that 
their rights are poorly protected. Individuals 
who loose in such contexts are usually women, 
absentee right holders or mortgagees, and in 
general people with less education and limited 
access to information becoming victim to ma-
nipulation and fraud.
4)  Increase in Disputes. Registration of land 
is expected to reduce the incidence of land 
disputes, by clarifying boundaries, by resolv-
ing ambiguities about rights over land and by 
putting in place a registration system that is 
transparent, reliable and accessible. In the 
short term, however, the process of adjudica-
tion and formalisation of rights may bring 
to the surface latent disputes that may have 
otherwise remained below the surface. Such 
potential risk needs to be assessed in the 
planning phase of a reform project. 
5)  Capitalisation: Difficult for the Poor in Ab-
sence of Adequate Land and Capital Markets. 
State of the art analysis reveals only a mod-
est positive effect of land titling on access to 
mortgage credit, and no impact on access to 
other forms of credit. It shows no effect on the 
labour income of the households holding new 
titles. However, it is shown that moving a poor 
household from uncertain usufructuary rights 
to a more complete bundle of property rights 
substantially increased investment in the fam-
ily houses. Property registration and guarantee 
of the homes reduced the size of families and 
these smaller families invested more in the 
education of their children. Another study finds 
that formal property rights lead to more avail-
able time for productive activities of property 
holders who do no longer need to defend their 
assets.94
Property rights bring increased economic ben-
efits when linked to a functional credit system 
and market, but they do not, by themselves, 
cause the emergence of a functional and pro-
poor credit system.95 Legal property rights ef-
fectively lead to credit and investment where 
robust financial markets exist and where there 
are further incentives for investment.96 Even 
when in possession of titles and registered 
property, small-scale farmers and the urban 
poor most often do not put their land or mod-
est dwellings at risk by using them as collat-
eral for credit.97 Tenure security and economic 
benefits other than capitalisation via collateral 
of land property seem to be primordial for 
the poor. Although they are efficient produc-
ers, small-scale farmers and business people 
tend to lose out in land and financial markets 
which are regulated with provisions that privi-
lege consolidation. Market based land reforms 
therefore now tend to be accompanied with 
targeted credit for the poor.
6)  Costs and Benefits of Property Rights Protec-
tion. From the perspective of the poor and 
the state, the costs of formal titles have to 
be weighed against the costs of insecurity of 
tenure, or against informal costs (bribes) in 
obtaining titles which harm the poor and the 
state.98 In many unreformed contexts, only few 
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households can afford the cost of a title.99 As 
will be discussed, adapting laws and proce-
dures to the social context can considerably 
reduce the costs of titling and registration 
by reducing administrative inefficiencies and 
by the use of modern technology. Legally en-
forced property rights systems are not neces-
sarily cost ineffective and expensive.100 
7) Fees and Taxes. The integration of irregular 
settlements into legal property rights systems 
increases tax revenues to governments.101 On 
the other hand it is obvious that inappropriate 
fees and taxes can push people back into extra-
legality.102 As far as the poor are concerned, 
registration fees and taxes have to be set at 
minimal levels. The key elements that have to 
be in place for property tax reform: existence of 
adequate technical expertise; appropriate land 
records and administration are required as the 
basis for the property lists; sufficient flexibility 
to allow the phasing in of major changes is es-
sential to forestall challenges and resistance to 
changes; political understanding and will are 
perhaps the most critical preconditions if the 
substantial challenges of implementing a highly 
visible, difficult to evade, tax, are to be over-
come.103
5. Recommendations for 
Reform and Improved 
Action
The diversity of contexts and stakeholders af-
fected by problems of faltering property rights, 
as well as the high complexity of the issue, does 
not indicate that there will be a one time, one-
size-fits-all solution. What is needed is a serious 
and continuously monitored reform process and 
parallel interventions inducing far-reaching and 
sustainable reforms of the four building blocks of 
the property rights system; that is: (1) reforming 
the property system as one of rules defining or 
enabling bundles and bearers of property rights 
allowing the poor to access and secure property 
alone, as members of communities, or as commu-
nities; (2) reforming it as a system of governance 
so that targeted actions securing the property 
rights of the poor can be taken effectively and le-
gitimately; (3) reforming it as a functioning mar-
ket of assets to include  the poor in the chains of 
value addition enabling them to become capable 
market participants, and (4) reforming the prop-
erty system as one of social policy with targeted 
measures of capacity building, information, and 
access to property and housing. Parallel reform 
work sustained by constant monitoring in all four 
dimensions is advocated to achieve real progress. 
Common features of policy design and prioritising 
are also dealt with in this section, and outlines 
are presented of important subsidiary and stabil-
ising actions that either have or can be taken by 
donor countries and multilateral organisations. 
Reforming Rules Regarding Bearers 
and Bundles of Property Rights
Property rights stand for the bundle of liberties 
and claim rights tied to the allocation of a re-
source to a natural or legal person. The property 
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system as a system of rules regarding the bun-
dles and bearers of property rights determines 
who can legally own property, what is recognised 
as property and what can be done with prop-
erty. Laws should promote rather than limit or 
discriminate against bearers of property rights; 
they should allow freedom to bestow sufficiently 
thick bundles of property rights on individuals or 
groups and should not unduly limit the scope of 
creative activity that can be invested in property.
Individual and common Private Property
Promote Individual and Corporate Legal Identity; 
Limited Corporate Liability. Property law should 
offer clear and simple options of legal personal-
ity and corporate ownership for small businesses 
and corporative associations of the poor. Legal 
personality so designed opens a range of pos-
sibilities of ownership by individuals, members 
of collectives, and by collectives. A legal person 
can hold property as an individual, but the defi-
nition of a legal person can also be extended to 
a collective or common property of a myriad of 
members, who in turn may own some property 
rights individually. Pro-poor property rights sys-
tems facilitate the ability of people to pool and 
leverage modest resources and limit liabilities in 
case of business failure or exit of partners. One 
key to economic success for small entrepreneurs 
in the developing world is the limited liability of 
business owners, allowing for controlled failure 
without disastrous consequences for the vulner-
able individuals involved. This legal instrument of 
limited corporate liability has to be extended to 
the poor micro entrepreneurs and rural producers 
in the developing world in a simple, straightfor-
ward manner. Its main advantage is formality of 
business ownership that trumps disadvantages of 
formality such as tariffs and taxes, provided these 
are affordable.
Promote Associational Property Structures. Hous-
ing and land associations prove how individual 
and common property can be combined to favour 
people with limited assets without disenfranchis-
ing them to a collectivity. The association, as 
legal person, is owner of the real property and 
collectively responsible for mortgage loans, giv-
ing the association more leverage in negotiating 
loans and public services. Members, however, get 
tradable rights to plots, houses or apartments, 
and contribute to repayment of the overall loan 
through monthly rent. Apartments or plots are 
increasingly sold at open market prices, but as-
sociation members have pre-emption rights to 
enter into the agreement at an agreed price.104 
The idea is to provide a form of ownership to bal-
ance the interests of the individual or family with 
those of a broader community. With this purpose, 
Australia introduced Strata Title in 1961 to better 
cope with apartment blocks. Other countries have 
adopted the Australian system of apartment own-
ership, including Canada, Singapore, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Fiji and the Philippines, and still oth-
ers have successfully created their own schemes. 
Strata title is not only applicable to vertical living 
but also to cluster living in slums. In many de-
veloping contexts, there has been a tendency for 
law to prescribe in too much detail the structure 
of local organisations and the rules by which they 
can operate. At the same time, injecting greater 
formality and accountability into local organisa-
tions is obviously important.
Simplified Property Rights Certification. Some 
countries have adopted simple, locally admin-
istered processes to confer legal land rights as 
alternatives to conventional land titling. They are 
practical, inclusive, benefiting growing popula-
tions of the rural poor,105 and are being increas-
ingly used to enhance urban land tenure securi-
ty.106 As many require no prior physical planning, 
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infrastructure, or surveying, they offer widespread 
coverage at low cost, affordable by the poor.
Recognising Customary Tenure and Communities 
as Bearers of Property Rights to Land and Natural 
Resources
Individual titling and/or alternative measures for 
incremental consolidation of property claims are 
appropriate and beneficial in many urban con-
texts.107 In rural contexts, especially in Africa and 
parts of Asia, they need to be phased in from other 
forms of tenure security or replaced by new ap-
proaches to securing tenure to more fully cover 
the spectrum of the local economic practices and 
conditions. The 1990s and early 2000s are replete 
with examples of legal reforms in the direction of 
recognising customary land rights (mainly in Afri-
ca, and notably in Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique 
and some West African countries), and indigenous 
land rights (Philippines, Cambodia, Australia, and 
a number of countries in Latin America). These 
innovations come from different contexts that may 
limit comparability; nevertheless, one can extract 
common threads and identify common problems 
that will require attention in the years ahead.108 
Broadly speaking, these laws share some of the 
following characteristics or aspirations:
• They recognise that in many contexts the 
social and economic value of land is best real-
ised by allowing land relations to be governed 
by rules of the community in which the land 
is located, rather than by imposed systems of 
property law.
• They reflect a conviction that community-
based tenure regimes are often better at 
providing security of tenure to individual cul-
tivators. Often, individual cultivators fear dis-
Box 2 Acquiring property rights for the poor
In Pakistan, incremental expansion of urban services 
allowed conversion of informal settlements (katchi 
abadis) in Hyderabad into legal housing neighbour-
hoods. In Trinidad and Tobago these alternative 
instruments have the advantage of being part of an 
incremental process of acquiring secure tenure. There, 
the State Land (Regularisation of Tenure) Law of 1998 
paved the way for progressive issue of Certificates of 
Comfort, Statutory Leases and Deeds of Lease to infor-
mal settlers on state land. A similar model has been 
under development in Namibia since the late 1990s 
and proposes a continuum comprising Starter, Land-
hold and Freehold titles. In Brazil, the usucapião is a 
form of adverse possession over private land, so there 
is no need for authorities to issue a title: the judicial 
sentence declaring that a new real right over the land 
has been constituted over time is the legal document 
necessary to promote land registration and ownership 
transfer. This can be done individually or collectively, 
and people get freehold rights either individually or 
in a form of co-ownership. It is a form of prescriptive 
acquisition, a real right (in the legal sense), and not 
temporary. It can be sold, inherited, etc., and there is 
no reason for banks not to accept it (Fernandes 2005). 
In India it is common practice to issue pattas giving 
rights to the poor over government land. The patta, a 
document issued by the Land Revenue Department, 
may be freehold or leasehold (99/30/10/1yr), renew-
able or not. It specifies conditions for use, transfer and 
inheritance, and may be used to regularise occupation 
or assign new plots. The patta is usually given free of 
cost, or with a small fee, and needs no registration to 
avail of rights specified. In states like Madhya Pradesh, 
Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal, it can 
be mortgaged against housing loans. If patta land is 
required for any ‘public purpose’, the holder has to be 
allotted alternate land. In Andhra Pradesh alone, more 
than 10 million pattas have been issued since 1962.  
     (Banerjee 2006)
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possession by government or outsiders, rather 
than by others within the community.
• They acknowledge that community-based 
systems are also often better at reflecting the 
complex rights that individuals, families and 
groups have over land, including secondary 
rights of access and use — rights that might 
be distorted or lost by titling according to a 
standardise format that is not adapted to local 
realities.
• They recognise that a community’s relation-
ship with land is more than an aggregate of 
individually occupied plots: it is a system that 
includes natural resources used in common.
Communal lands and common natural resources. 
Including grazing lands, forests, water, fisheries, 
in many poor countries are a special case of cus-
tomary tenure and crucial for the improvement of 
the legal and economic status of the poor. They 
are vulnerable to degradation and appropriation 
by powerful chiefs, outsiders, or state bureaucrats 
unless common property resource management 
systems are reinforced by legal sanction.
Increasing access to, and the locally beneficial 
productivity of land and natural resources, can be 
achieved by:
• Reaffirming and codifying customary rules in 
participatory ways, reflecting diversity in the 
ethnic, historical, and social construction of 
land. Also setting legal boundaries, identifying 
existing rights that may overlap or be of a sea-
sonal nature (e.g., between herders and sed-
entary agriculturalists), and registering them 
as appropriate and orderly tradable. 
• Allowing communal land ownership as one 
legal option and regular management deci-
sions in an accountable body that functions 
transparently — for example, as an incorpo-
rated user group — and having clear rules for 
conflict resolution that are respected by all 
involved. Arriving at culturally appropriate le-
gal forms for such bodies is key.
• Ensuring that customary forms of tenure can 
evolve towards more formal types of tenure 
through well-defined and transparent proc-
esses, if and when, in the judgment of those 
concerned, the benefits from more individual 
ownership exceed the cost.109
The status of informal rights has come strongly to 
the fore. Most derive from, and are sustained by, 
community-based arrangements — i.e. indigenous 
or customary regimes. If inroads made thus far 
evolve and expand, some 400 million Africans 
could benefit. No fewer than 40 million Indo-
nesians, or 40 million South Americans — and 
millions of others globally — could also benefit, 
should comparable tentative shifts mature. The 
Box 3 Namibian land reform
In Namibia, legal reforms in 1996 created a frame-
work for community-based natural resource man-
agement (CBNRM). Namibians who form conservan-
cies now have legal rights to manage wildlife and 
to benefit from tourism. With these secured rights, 
rural Namibians have reduced levels of poaching, 
have seen wildlife numbers increase substantially, 
and are seeing their ecosystems rebounding. A 
related benefit is that rural Namibians now have 
opportunities to pursue a new set of entrepreneurial 
ventures. They are empowered to build businesses 
based on eco-tourism and related activities. These 
businesses help to diversify livelihoods and pro-
vide valuable benefits for conservancy members. 
Namibia’s experience with CBNRM may provide a 
strong model for other countries: devolving secure 
legal rights to local people is promoting positive 
outcomes, both in terms of conservation and eco-
nomic development.                   Source: Boudreaux 2007
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implications promise socio-economic changes 
never quite achieved in previous reforms towards 
redistribution, collectivisation or conversionary 
titling. Obviously, where states are too weak to 
control local war and drug lords, devolving land 
ownership or management to local communities is 
not an option to empower the poor.
Critical Issues in the Recognition of Customary 
and Indigenous Tenure Systems
Drafting of laws that recognise customary tenure and that accommodate a number 
of such tenure systems within a national legal 
framework is a complex task. It is possible to 
identify a number of challenges that are likely to 
require attention from both drafters and imple-
menters:
Identifying Communities and Evolving Practices. 
State recognition of customary or community-
based tenure requires identifying, with some de-
gree of precision, the community whose property 
rights are being recognised, the area over which 
it has legitimate claims and the institutions or 
decision-making processes whose decisions and 
outcomes are entitled to respect by formal legal 
institutions. If carelessly done, formal recognition 
may have the effect of unduly privileging one of 
several competing local visions of what consti-
tutes a community, and what rules or authorities 
are legitimate.
Balancing Respect for Local Decision-making 
with Human Rights and Accountability. In some 
contexts, custom may run contrary to a vision of 
human rights enshrined in a national constitu-
tion, particularly where it comes to the treatment 
of women and minorities. A similar dilemma 
arises when it comes to ensuring minimum levels 
of accountability and transparency within cus-
tomary structures. However, customs are not rigid 
and unchanging. It is thus possible to aim at a 
process in which customary practices evolve in 
response to social development and human rights 
principles.110 
Protecting Customary or Indigenous Rights while 
Enhancing the Ability of Communities and In-
dividual Households to Explore New Economic 
Opportunities. There is no inherent contradiction 
between giving increased legal recognition to cus-
tomary or indigenous tenure systems and promot-
ing economic growth — indeed, in some contexts 
it is argued that the former is a pre-requisite for 
the latter. But the choice of legal techniques may 
skew the balance between protection on the one 
hand and the ability to adapt to new opportuni-
ties or challenges on the other. Protecting the 
integrity of local systems against the incursions of 
richer and more sophisticated outsiders may, as 
a starting point, justify short-term restrictions on 
the alienability of land. The question is whether 
emphasis on protection reflects the needs and as-
pirations of local people in rapidly changing eco-
nomic environments. Some laws provide avenues 
for communities or individuals to attract outside 
investment on their land, subject to an internal 
process of approval. There are in some cases op-
portunities for individuals or groups to ‘opt out’ of 
local tenure systems in favour of acquiring indi-
vidualised titles under a state-sponsored scheme.
The Challenge of Capacity and Conflict. Devolving 
greater authority to local institutions — whether 
traditional bodies or local governments — has its 
justifications. The question to be asked in each 
case, however, is whether specific reforms as-
sume the existence of greater capacities at vari-
ous points in the system than in fact exist, or can 
be expected to exist in the near future. In many 
contexts, conflict-ridden areas will not allow 
for community based land and natural resource 
management and require tighter central control. 
The challenge of capacity and conflict extends 
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to education and awareness of property rights 
among the common people, which is discussed in 
a subsequent section.
Measures to Make Property Systems More Gender 
Equitable
The UN Research Institute for Social Devel-opment notes that there has been ‘both con-
siderable progress throughout the 1990s in mak-
ing formal laws pertaining to land more gender 
equitable, as well as repeated failures in actually 
putting statutes to work.’111 Developing countries 
have, in many cases, enacted laws and policies to 
provide women with greater rights to control and 
manage property. Promising practices combine 
institutional measures, legal prescriptions and 
social policy:
Special Units to Monitor Gender Issues. Policy-
makers should establish special units to constant-
ly monitor gender issues and follow up on enforce-
ment. In some environments, police services and 
court systems fail to enforce women’s property 
rights. When property rights exist de jure but not 
de facto, policymakers face difficult choices: 
expend resources to better ensure enforcement 
or work to shift social norms. In countries with 
limited capacity the former route is difficult. In 
any country the latter is a major educational chal-
lenge. There is need for context-specific investiga-
tion of how best to shift social norms in ways that 
Box 4 Focus Africa
Customary rights may now be registered without con-
version into introduced forms in Uganda, Tanzania 
and Mozambique; the same is proposed in Lesotho, 
Malawi and Madagascar. Customary properties other 
than common properties may be registered in Namibia 
and Botswana (since 1968). Although not defined as 
customary rights, given their abolition in 1975, existing 
occupancy may also be registered ‘as is’ in Ethiopia. 
Customary rights in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Benin, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and South Africa may be certificat-
ed with substantial effect, but with required or implied 
conversion into existing statutory forms on final regis-
tration. Described incidents of customary rights reflect 
‘customary freehold’ and/or as customarily agreed by 
the modern community. Most laws allow for custom-
ary rights to be held in perpetuity, raising their status 
above that of leasehold or similar statutory forms 
common to most of Africa. Freehold is available mainly 
in Southern Africa. Only Tanzania and Mozambique 
endow customary interests with unequivocal equiva-
lency with imported tenure forms. Uganda proclaims 
this but also provides for conversion of customary cer-
tificates into freehold tenure. Lesotho and Malawi pro-
pose something similar. Mozambique does not practice 
what it preaches, giving investor interests in customary 
lands more support than customary interests. 
The status of unregistered customary rights — more than 90 percent of all rural landholding — is often 
ambivalent and remains permissive, pending registra-
tion. Customary rights not registered are explicitly pro-
tected in Uganda, Tanzania Mozambique and in a differ-
ent manner, in Ghana. Customary owners in Côte d’Ivoire 
have a short time limit within which  rights must be 
registered to be sustained. The movement of customarily 
held land out of government land/public land classes is 
clearest in Uganda, where public land is abolished, and 
Tanzania, where it becomes ‘village land’. More than in-
dividual title is recognised. Family title is widely provided 
for, especially in Ethiopian law and Malawian policy. 
Adoption of procedures, limiting transfers of family 
land without support of spouses, is provided in Uganda 
and Rwanda and proposed in Malawi and Lesotho. A 
presumption of spousal co-ownership exists in Tanzania 
land law. Efforts to secure such a presumption failed in 
Uganda. Ethiopia and Eritrea recognise male and female 
property rights distinctly.        
Sources: Alden Wily and Mbaya 2001; Alden Wily 2003c
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welcome women holding secure rights to property. 
This may well be a time-consuming process of 
norms evolving. It is an area in which much addi-
tional research is needed.
Joint Titling Efforts and Common Property. Gov-
ernments should register household property 
jointly in the name of both husband and wife. By 
virtue of marriage or sustained free union (do-
mestic partnership) real and moveable property 
held or bought by the male partner should au-
tomatically be considered the co-property of the 
woman. Women usually do not have the means to 
contribute 50 percent to the purchase of property 
in marriage.
Inheritance. The primary way the poor acquire 
land is through the family and by inheritance.112 
Many formal or informal legal systems favour men 
in distributions made by inheritance.113 In some 
cases, inheritance and succession laws provide 
widows with only temporary rights to use spousal 
property after their husbands die. These rules 
subject women to the potential of property grab-
bing. Many countries have amended constitutions 
or implemented legislation to guarantee the rights 
of women to inherit property on an equitable basis 
with men. However, in some countries may over-
ride these provisions by custom or family law, 
while a number still maintain discriminatory provi-
sions in their legal codes.114 Thus, for women, the 
existence of inheritance rules that call for male 
and female heirs to receive equal consideration in 
testamentary distributions are an important step 
on the path towards empowerment. There is some 
evidence that changing formal inheritance laws 
may have the unintended consequence of prompt-
ing men to specifically disinherit female heirs to 
avoid passing property to them.115
Education and Information. Women may be una-
ware of their legally guaranteed property rights. 
This on-the-ground reality suggests that there is a 
continued need to educate women and girls as to 
their legal rights to own, use and transfer property 
and to communicate to society broadly the nature 
of these rights.
Intellectual Property Rights and the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples: The Task Ahead
In most cases intellectual property is only indi-
rectly linked to the economic activities of the 
poor. However, in the case of indigenous people 
the issue of intellectual property is often related 
to forms of dispossession and property misuse. 
Discussions have focused on a wide range of 
issues, including moves to strengthen protec-
tion of traditional cultural expressions (TCEs), 
traditional knowledge (TK) and genetic resources 
(GR) against misappropriation and misuse.116 In 
analogy to this report’s focus on indigenous forms 
of tenure, rather than indigenous people as such, 
this section of the report pays attention to these 
forms of intellectual property rights rather than to 
the identification of their bearers. The UN Human 
Rights Council (Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples), the Convention on Biological 
Diversity117, the WTO TRIPS Council, UNCTAD, 
UNESCO, the FAO and WIPO have paid increased 
attention to the protection of TCEs, TK, and GR. 
Some view intellectual property rights as a use-
ful instrument for the conservation of TK, GR 
and TCEs and as a tool for implementing a ben-
efit-sharing. Others are more critical and fear a 
trivialisation of traditional cultures and possible 
misappropriation. Others still point to a funda-
mental conflict between the very notion of intel-
lectual property and the cultural values and moral 
perception of many indigenous populations. 
While indigenous notions of collective ownership 
and trans-generational custodianship might be 
compatible with the overall idea of (intellectual) 
93
property, some indigenous peoples aim to prevent 
appropriation of natural and cultural resources. 
In such cases, there is a fundamental conflict 
between indigenous rights and (intellectual) prop-
erty. In fundamental opposition to some indige-
nous cultures, many intellectual property systems 
recognise rights on inventions pertaining to living 
matter. In conventional patent systems, matter 
known to the public belongs to the so-called pub-
lic domain, thus preventing their protection and 
allowing their free use by anyone. Worse for some 
indigenous people, the concept of public domain 
associated with traditional intellectual property 
laws has allowed for the appropriation of GR and 
TK for the development of inventions that are 
subsequently patented.
Intellectual Property Rights in Context. The rights 
of indigenous peoples depend on and interact 
with a wide range of other measures and policies, 
such as land tenure, environmental laws and 
protection of endangered species, health, food 
and agriculture, water quality, cultural heritage 
protection, access to and exploitation of natural 
resources, environmental management, and soil 
conservation. Within this broader horizon, intel-
lectual property rights may play a positive role in 
encouraging creation or protection of indigenous 
rights. Such a role includes, for example, the 
protection and disclosure of new intellectual cre-
ations through the laws of patents and industrial 
designs or avoiding confusion and deception and 
preventing unfair competition through the protec-
tion of trademarks and geographical indications. 
Equally relevant are the safeguarding of the integ-
rity of, and rights of attribution to, certain works 
and creations through moral rights’ protection in 
copyright, and the protection of undisclosed in-
formation from bad faith use or appropriation. An 
example of the use of intellectual property rights 
in the protection of traditional knowledge relates 
to traditional medicines in the People’s Republic 
of China, in respect of which several thousand 
patents have been granted in past years.118
Way Forward. Notwithstanding useful aspects, 
many questions remain as well as important 
concerns: 
1. Conventional intellectual property rights might 
not offer indigenous peoples adequate protec-
tion in situations where the resource, knowl-
edge or cultural expression is already publicly 
known. In this case, the creation of sui generis 
systems of protection is needed.
2. The overall purpose of intellectual property 
rights for indigenous people in both positive 
protection and negative protection needs to be 
further evaluated.
3. Existing and future systems must ensure that 
they do not contribute to an undue misappro-
priation of certain intellectual assets of indig-
enous peoples.
International Dimension. In addition, because GR/
TK and TCEs are often exploited in countries dif-
ferent from the countries of origin, there are calls 
to establish international instruments that take ac-
count of the intangible nature and cross-boundary 
nature of those components of indigenous life and 
heritage. This will require examination of complex 
issues, such as the question of ownership/custodi-
anship of rights, form of protection to be granted, 
ways for ensuring nationals of one country to 
enjoy rights in foreign countries, question of fair 
and equitable benefit-sharing in the international 
context, recognition of personal or moral rights of 
indigenous people, ensuring that known resources 
or knowledge already in the public domain cannot 
be subject to intellectual property rights, and the 
need for enhanced international cooperation in 
areas such as mutual information, registration and 
management of rights, among others.
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The Intergovernmental Committee on Intellec-
tual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
knowledge and folklore (IGC), established by 
WIPO Member States in 2000 has adopted an in-
clusive approach. The IGC has been exploring the 
potential of protecting rights of indigenous peo-
ples through conventional intellectual property 
rights and through sui generis systems119, working 
towards an understanding of how best to protect 
TK and TCEs against misappropriation, clarifying 
issues such as the positive and negative protec-
tion and working on a better understanding of the 
international dimension of such protection. The 
IGC process has resulted in draft objectives and 
principles for the legal protection of TK and TCEs 
against misappropriation and misuse.120
Reforming Property Governance 
in view of the Least Advantaged 
Customer
The property system is upheld by a system of 
governance which includes the institutional order 
of the state, procedural rules and relationships 
of interaction between state and stakeholders, 
ranging from property registration, spatial plan-
ning, zoning, taxing and other aspects of property 
management, and enforcement. Since a property 
system with general deficits will not produce ben-
eficial results targeted to the poor, this section 
presents broader reform combined with measures 
that particularly promote the inclusion of the poor 
in effective property rights protection.121
Changing Legislation
Reforming the property system to produce tangi-
ble benefits for the poor might imply the need to 
change the law or introduce new legislation.122 
Such procedures are time consuming and hard to 
predict in their final outcome due to political con-
tingencies. It is thus advisable to first design the 
most urgent policy measures needed to improve 
the property access and security for the poor, and 
then to assess if the legal basis for the measures 
is sufficient. If this is the case, it might be more 
efficient to seek improvement within a given legal 
framework. In many cases, however, the imple-
mentation of pro-poor property rights, especially 
for customary owners and women, requires legal 
(statutory or customary) or even constitutional 
reform.123 
A government’s large-scale ownership of land, its ability to impose planning restrictions 
and to expropriate without adequate compensa-
tion, contributes to tenure insecurity and often 
demands legal reform as well. Reform might 
be undertaken with clear goals of what the new 
pro-poor property law should look like:  allowing 
private individual or group owned property of land 
under customary tenure; allowing the franchising 
of micro-enterprise with limited liability; allowing 
the use of moveable property as collateral; creat-
ing legal figures of associational property which 
allow the poor to pool and exit property; protect-
ing women’s property in and outside the marriage 
and in inheritance; restricting eminent domain, 
and introducing protective pro-poor zoning laws, 
among others. However, the inclusive procedure 
of making, implementing, and monitoring the 
consequences of the law by further regulations, 
as well as securing sustained support for the law 
from different stakeholders and agents, are as 
important as the content of the law itself. Po-
litical constellations might make sweeping and 
comprehensive reforms possible and hence advis-
able in some contexts. If not, it is also possible 
to approach the reform of property law in a more 
process-oriented manner. The following guiding 
principles have been useful in endeavours in dif-
ferent national contexts, where a one-time sweep-
ing reform was politically impossible: 
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• Where consensus is hard to obtain and/or 
medium-term effects hard to anticipate, a 
pragmatic and incremental approach to legal 
reform is often the best approach. 
• Legal and regulatory reforms can be obtained 
with the support of beneficiaries. But their 
short-term benefits have to be assessed in 
light of the provision of public goods and long 
term effects.124
• Legal and regulatory obstacles can be identi-
fied with the help of communities.125
• Applying a learning-by-doing approach to legal 
and regulatory change is beneficial for the 
progress of the reform project.126
In efforts to merge legality and legitimacy to so-
lidify effective impact and equity of property law, 
communication and consensus-building measures 
have proven to be of vital importance. Given the 
political sensitivity of property issues, securing 
and maintaining high-level consensus and com-
mitment to property reform is critical, especially 
as such support can falter during changes in the 
political administration, for example. Therefore, a 
consensus-building and communication strategy 
must be designed and implemented to sustain 
broad support.  
Reform Priorities in Land and Real Property 
Administration
A land and real property administration system 
that is generally dysfunctional will not all of a 
sudden produce targeted measures that benefit 
the poor. It is therefore advisable to make the 
system as a whole more efficient and friendly to 
the least advantaged customer. The combination 
of organisational simplicity and accessibility sig-
nificantly improves the efficiency of registration 
and administration, thereby increasing tenure 
security of broad sectors of the population and, 
as a result, public support. Effectiveness of legal 
provisions depends on availability of institutions 
for enforcement. In particular, many of the ex-
pected economic benefits (especially exchange 
and use of land as collateral) from secure land 
rights will not materialise unless a well-function-
ing, transparent, and accessible land administra-
tion system is in place.127
Simplicity. Every political entity should only have 
one or a strict minimum of well-coordinated 
property administration agencies. The integration 
of the cadastre, property, intellectual and com-
mercial registries contributes to improved output 
legitimacy and investment climate. Experience 
worldwide shows that delays and tenure insecu-
rity, due to rivalries and conflicting interests, are 
inevitable when a number of competing agencies 
are simultaneously responsible for the implemen-
tation of property rights.128
Accessibility. Local Presence. The locations of 
the agency should be as decentralised as possible 
and easily accessible for the poor who are unable 
to bear the costs of travelling long distances in 
order to register or transfer property.
Reduced Transaction Costs. Efforts to reduce the 
number of days it takes to formally register prop-
erty can have a positive effect in terms of reducing 
transaction costs. So too can reducing the number 
of steps buyers and sellers must follow before for-
mal transfers take place. However, in addition to 
such changes, countries should be encouraged to 
take additional steps to reduce transactions costs 
in property markets, mainly in organising public 
and private legal services in a pro-poor manner.129 
A key reason for land sales to be driven into infor-
mality, which can over time threaten the integrity 
of the registry information, is the desire to avoid 
high levels of taxation, mainly in the form of stamp 
duties, or the need to make informal payments. In 
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addition to setting clear fee structures that are well 
publicized, reduction of stamp duties, possibly 
by replacing them with a land tax to be assessed 
at the local level, would be desirable. Such a tax, 
complemented by a capital gains tax if necessary, 
could encourage productive land use and reduce 
incentives for speculative land accumulation, thus 
making productivity-enhancing outcomes from 
land sales markets more likely. Moreover, adjudi-
cation and dispute settlement can be embedded 
in a cost-saving, community-based participatory 
process. It is cost-effective for the state to invest 
in the capacity of a pool of potential conciliators 
at a community or district level of government.130 
For any first-time registration of land rights to have 
a lasting and pro-poor effect, it needs to be inte-
grated with systems to maintain registry records up 
to date in a cost-effective way that is in line with 
what users are able and willing to pay.
Modern GPS and Information Technology. In 
many contexts of the developing world, the tech-
nical costs of titling and land registration have 
been considerably reduced by computerisation 
and GPS systems.131 Modern technology can help 
to improve transparency and at the same time 
make administration more accessible.132 As the 
purpose of land registries is to give public no-
tice of land ownership and transactions, making 
registry information available publicly on the In-
ternet and promoting Internet access can reduce 
transaction cost and by allowing independent 
cross-checks, greatly increase public confidence 
in them. The transition to an all-digital, internet-
enabled land registration system is not without 
pitfalls. Corruption can easily increase in the 
early phase, because the opportunity for altering 
the records before digitisation is high. The intro-
duction of all-digital and internet-based registry 
systems has to be carefully prepared and pre-
emptive action to the altering of records taken. 
Corruption is reduced dramatically once the sys-
tems are operational.133
Financial Self-sustainability. Land administration 
institutions will be viable in the long term and 
independent from political pressure only if they 
can sustain their recurrent operations financially, 
without charging more than the poor are able to 
pay. This in turn is a precondition for all the other 
benefits from land administration to materialise.
Separation of Powers of Land Registration and 
Public Land Management. Land administration, 
i.e. all matters relating to land rights should be 
independent from the authorities in charge of 
state land management and use. This reduces the 
possibility of abusive practices where the state is 
only the means through which individuals pursue 
their particular interests and of which the poor 
are usually the first victims.
Increasing Transparency in Public Land Use and 
Planning 
Governments’ large-scale ownership of land, its ability to impose planning restrictions 
and to expropriate without adequate compensa-
tion also contributes to tenure insecurity of the 
poor who have no government lobby.134 
Define Government’s Land Rights and Duties and 
Establish an Inventory of Government Land: In 
virtually all countries, the government nominally 
owns large amounts of land. However, the extent 
of such claims and associated rights and obliga-
tions are often not well defined. At worst, this 
encourages sell-offs of public assets to the well-
connected leading to a speculative accumulation 
of large non-productive land holdings or conces-
sions. Keeping public land at the necessary mini-
mum and defining the responsibilities of different 
levels of government in terms of managing public 
land would be a first step that should be followed 
by a inventorying and registering of state land 
97
and the establishment of transparent administra-
tive processes at all levels for granting, selling, 
and leasing of state lands.
Strictly Circumscribe Conditions for Expropria-
tion of Land: As transferring land from agriculture 
to non-agricultural or urban uses is a corollary 
of economic development, an important issue 
that undermines tenure security in much of the 
developing world — and which has often caused 
great hardship to former land owners — is the 
government’s far-reaching ability to expropriate 
land with real compensation often far below mar-
ket rates. The threat of expropriation has served 
to undermine tenure security and investment and 
has also led to informal sales in anticipation of 
expropriation that often invited corruption and 
shady property deals involving state agencies. 
Productivity was impaired as the state apparatus 
had often neither the means nor the incentives 
to invest in or effectively use the land acquired, 
thereby often leaving the potentially most valua-
ble land undeveloped. One reason for this is that, 
in many countries, even land for private uses will 
first have to be acquired by the state, something 
that can greatly increase the transaction cost 
faced by private investors. Eliminating such rules, 
constraining expropriation to cases where a nar-
rowly defined public purpose is at stake, while 
allowing land owners or users to negotiate directly 
with interested parties in the remainder of the 
cases (with the possibility to draw on mediation if 
needed) can eliminate a key source of uncertainty 
and corruption.
Zoning and City Planning
Zoning and planning is one of the main causes of 
exclusion of the poor from legal and formal city 
and peri-urban development processes. On the 
other hand, the right use of zoning and spatial 
planning can become a formidable instrument of 
legal empowerment.135 Although this is perhaps 
most commonly a feature of the rural-urban zone 
of transition, it is also a feature within urban ar-
eas, and within rural areas.136 Especially changes 
in use from agriculture to urban residential or 
commercial purposes usually multiply the value 
of land significantly, and consequently augment 
the potential for abuse. Peri-urban areas need 
to be better planned if they are to be more ef-
fective in promoting sustainable pro-poor urban 
development. The ambit of interventions has 
to expand beyond slum upgrading and tenure 
regularisation to defining the urban development 
framework within which access to land and land 
development rights for the poor becomes possi-
ble.137 Spatial and urban planning can be a major 
driving force behind higher living standards and 
wealth generation.138 The relevance for urban 
planning is heightened in the idea that responsi-
bility, incentives and ownership should be aligned 
to maximise desired ends.139
Eliminate Inappropriate Planning Regulations. 
Overcoming extra-legality in urban areas will be 
impossible without a careful review of planning 
regulations - some of which, such as minimum 
lot sizes, were designed with the explicit purpose 
of segregating property markets. While regula-
tions may be introduced with more benevolent 
goals, they may nonetheless affect the poor nega-
tively and, through their impacts on urban forms, 
be environmentally and socially harmful. While 
it will be dangerous to generalise, in practice the 
only reason for the continued existence of harm-
ful regulations is either limited knowledge on 
alternatives or the fact that they benefit powerful 
vested interest groups who are generally not the 
poor.
Establish Transparent and Participatory Land Use 
Planning: Even if rules are well justified, in many 
countries, land use planning follows non-trans-
parent and highly centralised processes. This 
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implies that rules often have little relevance for 
the reality of the poor. Focusing central efforts on 
defining clear performance criteria for land use 
and ways of enforcement while leaving detailed 
planning to the local level are likely to result in 
plans that focus on relevant issues, have higher 
local acceptance, and thus stand a better chance 
of actually being implemented.
Avoiding Ghetto-formation by Mixed Neighbour-
hoods. New and ‘good old urbanism’ defines 
alternatives for urban growth and communities 
based on concepts of mixed neighbourhoods, 
mixed land use, diversity and public identity. 
These concepts work towards integrating urban-
ism and environmentalism, and joining rather 
than segregating the poor and ethnic minorities 
in diverse communities.140 
Special Social Interest Zones. Forming mixed 
neighbourhoods does not substitute for addi-
tional zoning and planning measures that can 
work to improve existing slums. Here, special 
interest zones can create protective and em-
powering environments of residence and busi-
ness activity for the urban and peri-urban poor. 
In Brazil several planning measures have been 
taken to provide secure conditions of living 
and livelihood for the poor. For instance, urban 
zones which have favelas, corticos (collective 
housing, popular subdivisions), and other forms 
of housing and home-based economic activities 
on vacant lands, can be declared as ZEIS or 
Special Social Interest Zones under municipal 
law. Special rules are drafted and simplified 
procedures adopted for each ZEIS by a local 
committee for regularisation of land occupa-
tion and use of land by the poor. ZEIS have 
now been adopted relatively successfully by a 
number of Brazilian cities.141 
Conditionality for Private Developers. One im-
portant provision, for instance of the progressive 
Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 of 
the Philippines142, is Balanced Housing Develop-
ment whereby developers of proposed subdivi-
sions are required to develop 20 percent of the 
land for housing low income communities. A 
similar provision of the Government of the Indian 
state of Madhya Pradesh enacted as part of the 
Colonisers’ Act requires 15 percent of the land to 
be reserved for without shelter households or pay-
ment of a sum equivalent to the officially deter-
mined price of the land to be reserved. The policy 
has made land available for housing more than 
6,000 poor households in central city locations in 
the city of Bhopal alone and substantial funds for 
land procurement and development.143
Density Mixed Use Zones legitimise densely built, 
small plots and home based businesses. The 
draft Nation Slum Policy of India144 proposes to 
integrate informal settlements into city planning 
by designating them as high-density mixed use 
zones, to legitimise densely built, small plots 
and home-based businesses. It also proposes 
that only slums in environmental risk areas and 
land use zones for essential services and facili-
ties should be relocated. All others should be 
regularised and their land use zoning should be 
changed to high-density mixed-use. The National 
Housing and Habitat Policy propose that land 
should be zoned for housing the poor in city mas-
ter plans.145
Reversing the Development Sequence in Slum 
Upgrading. The strategy of reversing the develop-
ment sequence by first allotting secured plots 
with only bare minimum services, with provision 
for incremental improvement gives the poor sus-
tainable ownership and participation in the value 
increase of property. Such measures match the 
affordability of allottees and assure that even the 
poorest get access to secure land and housing, 
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which develop into a fully serviced neighbourhood 
in the longer term.146
Supporting Street Entrepreneurs. Many Indian 
states have adopted the Central Government’s 
National Street Vendors’ Policy of 2004, aimed 
at recognising and planning for the informal 
but widespread activity of hawking and vending 
in cities and to provide basic facilities such as 
space, water and sanitation and access to cred-
it.147 The policy itself was framed after more than 
a decade of lobbying by NGOs and street vendors 
federations. Under the policy local governments 
of cities such as Bhopal, Hyderabad, Kolkata and 
Delhi have delineated Hawkers’ Zones. Initial 
indications are that this has ended harassment of 
the poor and provided them with security to carry 
out income earning activities.148
Involving Stakeholders in Spatial Planning. The 
strategy of using a survey to make claims and 
draw attention of the authorities to poor living 
conditions was first used in Mumbai in 1987 by 
pavement dwellers supported by The Society for 
the Promotion of Area Resource Centres (SPARC). 
This was followed by women pavement dwell-
ers identifying potential vacant lands in the city 
for their relocation, and forcing the city govern-
ment to act. This strategy paved the way for civic 
authorities to recognise the role of civil society 
organisations in developing responsive housing 
solutions for the poor, and later participating in 
framing the relocation and rehabilitation policy 
for the World Bank funded Mumbai Urban Trans-
port Project. Similar initiatives are taking place 
in Thailand with the support of CODI (Community 
Organisations Development Institute), which is a 
government organisation created to facilitate local 
housing improvement and livelihood initiatives of 
community groups.149
Implementation and Dispute Settlement
Expand Options for Conflict Resolution. Im-
plementation is a decisive element of property 
rights governance. Where it fails, it can nullify 
or considerably reduce the effectiveness of all 
other elements. Developing countries are often 
at loss of stable and predictable implementation 
and dispute settlement institutions. Traditional 
institutions can resolve some forms of localised 
disputes. But they are not well equipped to ad-
dress disputes that cut across groups from dif-
ferent communities (e.g. nomads and sedentary 
agriculturalists), across ethnic boundaries, or that 
are between individuals and the state. Even so, 
expanding the range of options to resolve land 
conflicts systematically and out of court can have 
large benefits, especially for the poor and for 
women who otherwise are often unable to enforce 
their legal rights.150 In many contexts, Third Party 
Arbitration Courts (TPACs) can be considered an 
economic and social success. These mechanisms 
offer effective protection of property rights and/or 
effective resolutions of disputes over contested 
property arrangements, especially for disenfran-
chised women. 
Alternative dispute resolution is very promis-ing but has its pitfalls. In general, success 
of alternative dispute resolution depends on 
certain standards and practices. An important 
condition is the right of poor people to appoint 
judges of their choice for dispute resolution. But 
it is equally imperative that the alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanism be linked to formal 
enforcement and not operate totally outside the 
realm of the legal system. Rules have to be craft-
ed in accordance with the formal legal and infor-
mal social context. If supported by aid, financial 
sustainability should be guaranteed for the time 
after donor support has stopped.151 
Include Property Issues in Post-conflict Settle-
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ments and Natural Disaster Management. In the 
many situations where land issues have often 
been at the root of broader civil strife, failure to 
devote proper attention to these issues, including 
ways of managing land access by returnees, can 
easily undermine their sustainability of such set-
tlements and sow the seeds for violence. Learning 
from successful examples to address land-related 
grievances and settle large numbers of people in 
a rapid and decentralised way together with ways 
that will prevent limited conflicts from festering 
and escalating into larger ones can help to avoid 
much broader clashes, often with very damaging 
humanitarian and economic consequences.152
Reforming the Property System as 
a Market of Assets for the Poor
A functional property system allows for the trans-
formation of assets into fungible property rights 
and for the exchange of those rights in open mar-
kets. In order to benefit the poor, real property 
and credit markets need to be developed and 
they need to be regulated where they systemati-
cally work against the poor. In general, reforms 
should aim at opening the door to the poor to a 
broadened asset base. Guaranteeing the poor the 
right to property and to leverage property in the 
market is a multi-stakeholder task best achieved 
by close partnerships between the state, the pri-
vate sector and civil society.
Market Development
A Pro-poor Framework for Land Sale Markets. 
Historically, most land sales were due to distress 
that required defaulting landowners to cede con-
trol of their land to moneylenders, who amassed 
huge amounts of lands.153 However, data on 
land sales over 20 years in India illustrate the 
importance of land sales markets and of being 
in the land markets: First, they transferred land 
to better cultivators and from land-abundant to 
land-scarce households, allowing the land-scarce 
to improve their welfare154 without making sell-
ers worse off. Sales markets were indeed thin-
ner, more affected by life-cycle events, and less 
redistributive than those for rentals. Land sales 
markets helped purchasers, many of whom were 
formerly landless, to accumulate non-land assets 
and significantly enhance their welfare.155 Efforts 
at redistributive land reform will need to aim at 
complementing what market forces are achieving. 
Market development with the poor in mind ought 
to be pursued by:
• Granting freedom of contract, definition of 
obligations, remedies for failing to fulfil obli-
gations and for terminating obligations orderly, 
guidance on how to conclude a contract, defi-
nition of forms of contract (oral or written); 
identification of invalid transactions.
• Making land purchase and sale easier for the 
poor by minimising conditions such as formal 
education or experience in agriculture. Provide 
model sales contracts the poor can rely on.
• Keeping leasing rules simple and clear.
• Reducing transaction costs for the poor by 
avoiding overly precise mapping, avoiding rep-
etition of platting parcels, not covering initial 
platting fees for the poor. 
• Avoiding notary fees for small transactions; 
keeping registration fees and transaction taxes 
very low for small transactions and exempt-
ing new and small land owners from registra-
tion fees and tax; putting to severe need test 
and cost-benefit analysis every administrative 
intervention into land deals and eliminating 
interventions which do not stand the test.
• Granting preferential rights to buy to co-own-
ers, neighbours, or leaseholders of land.
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Ceilings of ownership work in some contexts for 
some time but have adverse consequences for 
the poor in the long run.156 Sales moratoria are 
considered a successful practice, provided the 
time is used for public education on land values, 
financial literacy, and participation in land mar-
kets.157 Where the moratoria extend over a longer 
amount of time, they install barriers which do not 
correspond to the needs and capabilities of the 
poor. Notwithstanding prohibitions, land pawning 
transactions, direct sales, sales through waiver of 
rights, sales through pawning, and sales through 
land conversion arrangements are sometimes 
widespread. Ultimately, these transfers augment 
the risk of losing land rights.
Bringing the Poor into the Market: Opportunities 
and Responsibilities of Medium and Large Compa-
nies. Large companies, regardless of their industry, 
can stimulate local markets and increase the value 
of the real, moveable, and equity property of the 
poor by enabling them to become active partici-
pants in their chains of value addition. Inclusion 
of the poor in the value chain creates business 
opportunities for the next decade. Designing busi-
ness models to address this challenge opens new 
opportunities for company growth as well as for 
broadening the assets base for the poor. Many 
business leaders now believe that the planet’s poor 
must become part of company growth strategy, 
and that the presence of their enterprise in a de-
veloping nation will be crucial to their long-term 
success, with the advantage going to early movers. 
To be successful, however, such projects must be 
based on the real needs, capabilities, and realities 
of low-income communities.158
The focus on business implies focus on profitabil-
ity. If the projects realise the goal of profitability, 
this means that they have no limited, fixed budget. 
The new business can thus become replicable and 
lead to a remarkable empowering impact. Provid-
ing business solutions for the poor and with the 
poor can cover a multitude of activities. The guid-
ing principle is that companies should engage the 
poor in a business relationship that relates directly 
to their core commercial operations. 
The poor may be customers and can profit from 
more affordable products.159 The poor may also be 
business partners, suppliers, and/or distributors. 
The poor can be considered as partners creating 
added value at every stage of the delivery of a 
service/product designed to serve their needs.160 
By bringing small entrepreneurs and local small 
Box 5   Sale of  land: examples of  
legal issues
In the collective certificate of land ownership award 
(CLOA) system of the Philippines not even a majority 
of the collective can decide to sell, mortgage or use 
the title as collateral to obtain formal credit. Under 
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the 
same country, there was a prohibition on any form 
of transfer within 10 years of award. In addition, a 
five-hectare ceiling on ownership was set and only 
qualified farmers can buy awarded land. This did 
not stop but increase transfers and pushed them 
into extra-legality with adverse consequences for 
the poor (NCLEP Philippines 2006). In Armenia, 
a three-year moratorium was imposed after land 
privatisation in 1991. In Ukraine, a 6-year sales 
moratorium will expire in 2005, but many exemp-
tions have circumvented this measure. A Kyrgyz 
moratorium on the sale of agricultural land was put 
into place when land was privatised and allocated, 
but it was subsequently lifted in September 2001. 
The Moldovan Land Code contained a 10-year mora-
torium on sales that was declared unconstitutional 
and lifted in late 1996. Some countries have at-
tempted to protect new landowners from the danger 
of mortgage foreclosure by setting moratoria on 
mortgages; for example, a 1997 Russian law prohib-
ited mortgages on agricultural land (Russian Law 
On Mortgage 1997).
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and medium enterprises (SMEs) into their value 
chains, established international business can 
empower the poor and accelerate skill transfer.161 
Companies addressing basic needs, such as utili-
ties and health care providers, can contribute sig-
nificantly to local development by expanding their 
services to more low-income communities.162 
Extractive companies often find themselves do-
ing business with low income governments and 
communities through their drilling and mining 
contracts, licences, fees and royalties. They thus 
have a major influence on the paths of develop-
ment of poor countries.163
Moveable and Intangible Property: A Missing 
Piece of the Development Puzzle
Although many of the citizens of the developing 
world lack secure rights to use and transfer real 
property, most of them actually do own some tan-
gible (moveable) or intangible property (business 
skills and informational schemes).164 Peasants 
and urban street entrepreneurs alike use moveable 
property as means of production. To the extent 
that this type of property is held securely and can 
be used to access credit to create and grow busi-
nesses, the poor will have increased opportunities.
Collateralising moveable and intangible property 
can play an important role in a nation’s develop-
ment strategy.165 In many parts of the developed 
world, a broad array of personal property, both 
tangible and intangible, can be used legally as 
collateral to secure a loan, whereas in many parts 
of the developing world, only a small fraction of 
this property can be used as collateral.166 There 
is evidence that expanding the number of items 
that can be used legally as collateral reduces the 
cost of credit. And because more people can bor-
row if more types of property can be used as col-
lateral credit markets become more competitive. 
Lenders pass along their savings to customers, 
by reducing fees and offering lower interest rates 
and competitive forces also help to keep the price 
of credit lower than it otherwise would be.167
For small-scale enterprises, such cost savings can 
have a major positive impact. SME entrepreneurs 
of developing countries routinely list financing 
and access to credit as their major obstacle to 
growth.168 To the extent that collateral law reform 
makes borrowing easier and less costly, it could 
very well serve to promote SME development in 
many countries.
Creating a public moveable and intangible prop-
erty registry (or, more simply, a registry listing 
stolen items), and enacting legal reforms that 
make it easier to use moveable and intangible 
property as collateral, will expand access to credit 
for the poor. Experience in a variety of develop-
ing countries (one should include here Georgia, 
Madagascar, Colombia, Albania, and Bosnia, 
among others) suggests that there are at least 
three important legal reforms that would serve to 
allow the poor to leverage movable and intangible 
property. These are: 
• Allowing for freedom of contract in loan agree-
ments so that borrowers are free to use move-
able and intangible property as collateral. 
Lenders and borrowers should be free to deter-
mine, between themselves, which property will 
be used as collateral for a loan.
• Provide secured creditors with first priority 
with pledged collateral. Evidence that a credi-
tor is secured may be obtained from a collat-
eral registry.   
• Creditors should be empowered to enforce col-
lateral agreements quickly by means of sum-
mary proceedings.
If developing nations allowed borrowers greater 
freedom to use moveable and intangible property 
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as collateral more of the poor would be able to 
create credit histories. For borrowers, the great-
est risk is losing real property. With moveable 
property, the loss is proportionate and collateral 
can be better matched to the size of the loan.169 
The poor may be understandably hesitant to use 
the title to their home as collateral for a loan, but 
if they can use a refrigerator as collateral, they 
may be able to borrow smaller sums that will help 
them start or build a business or send a child to 
school.
Creating a moveable and intangible registry is 
less expensive than the creation of land registries 
— it may take as little as $500,000 and no more 
than two years of time to create a self-financing 
moveable and intangible property registry.170 For 
developing countries, amending laws and regula-
tions on collateral, in conjunction with the estab-
lishment of registry may be a feasible, cost-effec-
tive and pro-poor development strategy.  
When conditions of instability and conflict exist, 
when the rule of law is absent, and when other 
institutional structures do not appear to be func-
tioning, one should expect that reform aimed at 
improving the security and usefulness of move-
able and intangible property would not, by itself, 
create economic growth. 
Equity Based Asset-Building for the Poor 
Creating	Property	Value	for	the	Poor	by	Share-
holder	Systems
Innovative forms of non-real estate can extend 
the asset base of the poor and non-credit based 
shareholder ownership, enabled by the fungible 
nature of property rights. Unlike land and hous-
ing, the reproductive potential of non-tangible 
objects of property is potentially unlimited. While 
the private sector is at the heart of this enter-
prise, the state has an important role to play in 
guaranteeing contracts and transactions and in 
creating an overarching enabling framework for 
equity based pro-poor business and banking prac-
tices.
Natural Resources Requiring Capital Intensive 
Extraction, Treatment and Distribution. In the case 
of state co-ownership of fossil energy reserves, the 
local populations should be included in the chain 
of value addition by tradable shares in general 
public funds. Many of the poor people of the world 
live in lands rich in natural resources that are con-
trolled through government ownership. Distributing 
shares to populations or other form of ownership 
participation in state owned companies exploiting 
natural resources will provide the poor with capital 
that can, among other things, propel the expansion 
of small businesses. An alternative option is dis-
tributing titles to special funds created by govern-
ments to invest profits yielded by commodities. 
Recent experience in Kenya is illustrative of how 
the poor are willing to convert their rights into 
capital, given the right framework. The offering 
of Ken Gen State Owned Corporation intended 
to raise 8 billion Kenyan Schillings, but instead 
raised 26 billion Schillings and drew three times 
the number of anticipated investors, many of 
who immediately tripled their money. As a re-
sult investments in the stock market have grown 
since 2002 from 50,000 investors to more than 
750,000 with much of the growth coming from 
rural areas. The exchange’s total value jumped 
from 1 billion Schillings to 12 billion Schillings, 
an amount that is predicted to grow following the 
biggest initial public offering in Kenyan history 
of cell phone giant Safaricom. Natural resources 
rich countries such as Iraq, Venezuela, Chile, 
Peru, Congo and South Africa could easily em-
power their poor people by directly transferring 
property of their oil or minerals.175
104
Banking for the Poor. As often mentioned, the 
poor still make relatively little use of titles as 
commercial credit. This is due to the perceived 
risks involved, as well as the difficulty or impos-
sibility of accessing credit. One effort to begin to 
address the problem associated with low levels 
of banking activity among low-income earners 
are Mzansi accounts, low-fee bank accounts de-
signed for people working in the informal sector. 
These accounts are offered by a group of South 
African commercial banks in conjunction with the 
South African Post Office, and they have been 
quite successful. They allow people to become 
‘banked’, providing a means to establish a credit 
history while risking less than the title to real 
property.
Reforming the Property System as an 
Instrument of Social Policy
Property reform with the poor in mind can be an 
efficient instrument of social policy with benefits for 
society at large. The state can foster the social fab-
ric through property rights, such as in housing and 
neighbourhood development, low interest loans and 
the low priced sale of state land tied to conditions 
of productivity and market based redistribution of 
private land. Local political authorities can also see 
the reform path towards more equitable property 
regimes as an opportunity to install participatory 
processes and broader social dialogue in order to 
promote self-responsibility and social cohesion via 
ownership not only of property but also of the policy 
processes that establish property rules.
Box 6 The Grameen Bank
Still the 7.06 million poor borrowers of the bank, of 
which 97 per cent are women, own the most illustrious 
example of a broadening of the asset base of the poor 
by shareholder strategies. Borrowers of Grameen Bank 
at present own 94 per cent of the total equity of the 
bank. The government owns the remaining 6 percent. 
The Grameen Bank is impressive in size and impact. 
It has 2,399 branches. It works in 76,848 villages. 
Total staff is 22,169.171 Loan recovery rate is 98.28 
per cent.172 Grameen Bank finances 100 per cent of its 
outstanding loan from deposits of which over 60 per 
cent come from the bank’s own borrowers. Many bor-
rowers are moving ahead in businesses faster than 
others. Grameen Bank provides larger loans, called 
micro-enterprise loans, for these fast moving members. 
There is no restriction on the loan size. So far 1,085,959 
members took micro-enterprise loans. A total of Tk 
23.42 billion (US$364.91 million) has been disbursed 
under this category of loans. Average loan size is Tk 
21,566 (US$313), maximum loan taken so far is Tk 1.2 
million (US$19,897). 
Scholarships: Scholarships are given to the high per-
forming children of Grameen borrowers, with priority on 
girl children. Up to March 2007, scholarships amount-
ing to US$550,000 have been awarded to 48,974 
children. During 2007, US$775,000 will be awarded 
to about 30,000 children, at various levels of educa-
tion. By March 2007, 15,754 students received higher 
education loans, of them 14,739 at various universities; 
176 are studying in medical schools, 335 are studying 
to become engineers, and 504 are studying in other 
professional institutions.
Grameen Bank-Created Companies: A number of companies were created by Grameen Bank, as 
separate legal entities, to spin off some projects 
within Grameen Bank funded by donors. Donor funds 
transferred to Grameen Fund were given as a loan from 
Grameen Bank.173 Grameen Bank created an internal 
fund called Social Advancement Fund (SAF) by imput-
ing interest on all the grant money it received from 
various donors. SAF has been converted into a separate 
company to carry out its mandate to undertake social 
advance activities among the Grameen borrowers, such 
as, education, health, technology, etc.174
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Enhancing Access to Land and Real Property
Landlessness is one of the greatest predictors of poverty. Increasing security of property 
rights will have limited direct benefits for those 
who do not have any real assets at all. While 
land rental markets can, in rural areas, provide 
an important avenue for greater land access by 
the poor and landless, they need to be comple-
mented by other measures to increase the asset 
endowment of the poor in situations where huge 
inequalities persist.
Create an Enabling Environment for Rental Mar-
kets. In most developing countries land and real 
property rental markets are underdeveloped. But 
land and real property rentals are increasing. Pro-
ductivity-enhancing rental transactions will not 
fully materialise or the poor may be excluded, if 
leasehold tenure is insecure or restrictions con-
strain land leasing.176 Replacing them with policies 
that facilitate renting will improve access to land by 
those remaining in the rural sector.177 More robust 
and transparent guarantees should strengthen the 
position of slum dwellers in rental arrangements 
and protect them from arbitrary eviction.
Legal Recognition of Informal Settlements. 
Ensure the property rights of urban shanty-
dwellers and rural state land squatters by grant-
ing them title to their already occupied lands 
or suitable alternatives (see Section 5 of this 
Chapter), and introduce anti-eviction rights, limi-
tations of compulsory acquisitions, resettlement 
policies, adverse possession rights and family/
group rights.178
Making Land Reform Effective for Increasing 
Productive Assets by the Poor. Land markets, 
or formalisation of existing land rights, are not 
a panacea for addressing structural inequalities 
which reduce productivity of land use and hold 
back development.179 To overcome the legacy of 
such inequality, ways of redistributing assets such 
as land reform will be needed. While the post-war 
experiences of China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
show that land reform can improve equity and 
economic performance, many other cases where 
land reform could not be fully implemented or 
even had negative consequences illustrate the dif-
ficulties involved. Where redistributive land reform 
is found to be more cost-effective in overcoming 
structural inequalities than alternatives, it needs to 
be complemented by access to managerial ability, 
technology, credit, and markets for the new owners 
to become competitive. A possible alternative, the 
impact of which needs to be explored more sys-
tematically, is the distribution of small house and 
garden plots to the destitute to increase their food 
security and social status while at the same time 
allowing them to climb at least the first rung on 
the property rights ladder.
Community-Based Land Reform. As an alterna-
Box 7   Mexico: the poor rely on 
pawnshops instead of  
banks
Most Mexican citizens do not have access to bank-
ing and only 13 percent hold mortgage debt. In the 
absence of financial institutions, the poor and lower 
middle classes rely on pawn shops. As movable 
collateral valuation of consumer goods is difficult to 
establish, the value of the collateral typically short-
changes the consumer. The annualised rate charged 
by these pawnshops ranges from 48 percent 
charged by a non-profit pawnshop to 160 percent by 
a for-profit pawnshop. Some pawnshops will accept 
houses as collateral (whether the underlying land 
is legally owned or not) in exchange for three year 
loans.
(La Crónica de Hoy, El top ten de la usura: la casa 
de empeño Mister Money cobra 159.6 percent de 
interés anual; Prenda Fácil, 146 percent; Montepío 
48 percent. Mexico City, October 9, 2006.)
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tive to authoritative reallocation of land, com-
munity-based land reform projects provide funds 
to groups of beneficiaries to purchase land. While 
being market-based, the idea behind such meas-
ures is that land sale markets often do not move 
land to those who have none or to small efficient 
producers. The provision of funds is made avail-
able under the condition of a productive purpose 
and when land markets are sufficiently devel-
oped. The procedure is legally less complicated 
and politically less sensitive than in compulsory 
acquisition programmes. Legal reform might be 
required in the determination of legal personality 
of associations or incorporations for the groups 
eligible for funding, but it is probably best to let 
beneficiaries experiment with a number of possi-
ble associational forms. Legal conditionality re-
garding the groups of beneficiaries does, however, 
leave room for the pursuit of other social purpos-
es. In Andhra Pradesh, for instance, purchased 
land is given in the name of women only.180
Limit Administrative Controls on Sales. Often 
there is little justification for policy measures to 
restrict land sales which drive land sales under-
ground and undermine access to formal credit. 
If there is an issue of asymmetries in power, ac-
cess to insurance, and information leading to 
undesirable land market outcomes or speculative 
land accumulation, safety nets and other meas-
ures, including ways of redistributing land, will 
be more appropriate to prevent distress sales. 
Moreover, land taxes with temporal and user-ori-
ented conditionality can curb speculative demand 
and encourage better land use, while providing 
revenue for local governments.181 
Make benefits from past land reform permanent: 
There are also many situations where those who 
have received land rights in the past are unable 
to enjoy the full benefits because they have not 
received full ownership rights or because transfer-
ability of their rights was restricted. As second 
generation problems can threaten to undermine 
earlier successes, it will be important to provide 
full ownership rights to those affected, if need 
be by identifying innovative approaches — e.g., 
a credit-financed purchase of residual ownership 
rights by one of the parties involved.
The Beneficial Effects of Property Related 
Education and Relevant Information.
Households’ awareness and information of rights has a significant and large impact 
on the positive outcomes of property regimes.182 
There is evidence of a strong and positive rela-
tionship between households’ objective knowl-
edge of the law and land-related investments 
and, through such investments, on productivity 
and land values. The fact that often only a minor-
ity of land users is aware of relevant legal provi-
sions implies that the lion’s share of the associ-
ated productivity gains remains to be realised. 
Given their low cost, especially if compared to 
efforts to demarcate lands, programmes to dis-
seminate the law and make households aware 
of their rights could thus have very high returns 
and should accompany any property rights reform 
policy. Scientific evidence as well as grass-roots 
consultations by the Commission on Legal Em-
powerment of the Poor demonstrates that social 
policy should promote legal literacy and proce-
dural assistance to close the discrepancy between 
legal provisions and ground realities, and to help 
those who are given rights through the law to ex-
ercise them.183
Promoting Access to Housing
Urban Infrastructure projects, housing and prop-
erty rights creation can be pursued together and 
are mutually reinforcing.184 As a sector, housing 
is a local economic activity, generating income, 
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employing local labour, and re-circulating income 
into the local economy. Housing production pro-
duces spill over effects such as the development 
of skilled labour, and production of household 
goods.185 Further, from a macroeconomic per-
spective, the housing sector has a broad impact 
on economic performance affecting prices, in-
vestment and employment, strengthening the 
financial sector and fiscal budget, and having a 
pervasive impact on the economy.186
Access to Housing as a Poverty Alleviation Strat-
egy.187 Decent and safe housing provides a stable 
place for family activities; it enables the storage, 
preservation, and preparation of food; it is a fixed 
location for delivery of services such as water 
and collection of household refuse for orderly 
disposal; and, it serves as a protected place to 
guard possessions from environmental damage or 
theft.188 Loss of housing, tragic anywhere, can be 
catastrophic in the developing world.189 Housing 
stability is a particularly important poverty alle-
viation strategy for women. In developing econo-
mies the home not only serves as shelter but also 
is frequently a place for business.
Housing Finance. Analysis by UN-Habitat reveals 
that the global housing needs cannot be met by 
aid or state subsidies alone. Meeting the housing 
needs of the world’s poor will require economic 
growth (job and income generation) and housing 
finance. However, stimulating housing production 
and catalysing financial markets have other posi-
tive effects, that go beyond the development of the 
housing itself. In markets where financial institu-
tions are not active because a market is untested, 
governments can leverage private sector financing 
by providing credit enhancement to support bor-
rowers, developers or lenders; using subsidies ju-
diciously to leverage financing, assuring transpar-
ency; and facilitating information. There are many 
models of specialized programs that provide incen-
tives to financial institutions to lend to the poor as 
well as to those who serve them. The government 
can play a catalytic role in bringing together the 
private sector and other institutions.190
Despite the obvious importance of housing pro-
duction and its reliance on finance, the existing 
financing instruments to address the shelter needs 
of the poor are at a nascent stage. Existing instru-
ments do not fully respond to the reality of poverty 
or the need.191 To meet the need, many countries 
adopt housing policies, known as ‘filtering’ strate-
Box 8  Example of  Singapore: 
public housing as  
economic stimulant 
Singapore’s experience has shown that public hous-
ing construction expenditure can have a multiplier 
effect that stimulates the economy and contributes 
employment growth in the building and construction 
industry. The ratio of construction to the country’s 
GDP has increased both absolutely and relatively 
over the past three decades, about 40 percent of 
GDP. The construction industry has a labour ab-
sorption capacity for skilled and unskilled workers. 
Estimates indicate that the construction of one 
unit of public housing at the time of the Housing 
and Development Board’s (HDB) first building pro-
gramme (1960-65) would generate employment for 
a person for nine months directly at the construction 
site, while a HDB building programme of 10,000 
units per year would create 15,000 jobs. In addition 
with the policy of reserving about 10 percent of new 
town land for industrial development public hous-
ing investment has generated a significant number 
of new jobs near the homes of new town residents, 
especially for women who otherwise might not have 
entered the labour force. Over the 10-year period 
1970-80 female participation rates increased from 
29.5 percent to 44.3 percent. Thus, housing should 
not be viewed simply as a means of resolving shelter 
problems but also as a potentially leading sector of 
growth in national economy.          Source: Yuen 2002.
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gies.192 However, a key limitation of a mortgage-
based filtering strategy is that it has a long time 
horizon at best; and, a market-based filtering 
strategy that is not matched with housing policies 
targeted to the poor, will result in inequalities and 
leave the poor behind.
Some countries have been extensively involved in 
setting housing goals and directly financing hous-
ing. Singapore, once characterised by vast squat-
ter settlements, established a Housing and De-
velopment Board (HDB) to finance and subsidise 
housing developed by the state but constructed 
by the private sector and then sold to homebuy-
ers. Over 85 percent of Singaporeans live in 
government-built housing. Singapore has empha-
sised a homeownership strategy that has played 
a key part in raising residents’ sense of belonging 
to the new living environment.
There are also many examples of developing na-
tions committed to meet their housing challenges 
and testing and developing a broad variety of 
housing policies. South Africa quickly started 
off with an impressive array of housing policy 
responses, such as housing plans, fixed interest 
loan products, micro-loan financing, a securiti-
sation conduit, and partnerships with financial 
institutions. The country is still in the process of 
experimentation and evaluation, but the commit-
ment to its housing sector is clear.193
Public Private Partnerships 
Several forms of public private partnerships (PPPs) were developed in the last two dec-
ades with built-in provisions of housing for the 
poor. This period saw the economies of several 
developing countries booming and globalising, 
with a direct impact on cities like Sao Paolo, 
Mumbai, Delhi, Seoul, Kuala Lumpur, Manila and 
Jakarta. Economic opportunities created a huge 
demand for space for businesses and housing, in 
turn creating business opportunities for the real 
estate sector, for which it needed land in prime 
locations and land with trunk services in periph-
eral areas, both of which were scarce. The same 
economic opportunities meant a growing popula-
tion of the poor who could afford only informal 
access to space in the city, with all its legal and 
environmental insecurities. Pressures placed 
upon city development institutions, therefore, 
gave birth to public-private partnerships as one 
approach to solving problems affecting both the 
real estate sector and the poor.
Successful PPPs from which the poor have ben-
efited have tended to rely on instruments of the 
state for trunk infrastructure that would ensure 
adequate timing of project development, and for 
enforcement of new regulations and laws. There 
are several examples where a combination of these 
instruments has been used to ensure legal/formal 
access to land and housing for the poor. Guided 
Land Development has been implemented in the 
Box 9  Singapore: importance  
of  workers’ Central  
Provident Fund
Under the scheme first instituted in 1955, employees 
in Singapore are required by law to save a propor-
tion of their monthly income in a central provident 
fund (CPF) account. Employers also make monthly 
contributions to their employees’ CPF account. Much 
of these savings are invested in government securi-
ties, providing a cheap and ready source of finance 
to the government for public housing construction 
and national capital formation. They also provide a 
source of mortgage financing at the individual level 
to help home buyers meet their mortgage payments 
without the need to dip into their cash reserves. For 
the average worker the monthly repayment for the 
flat is less than half of the CPF savings deposit.
Sources: Yuen 2002, 2005.
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periphery of cities like Seoul, Jakarta, Chennai, 
and Delhi, under conditions obliging private land-
owners to provide a certain percentage of small 
plots which poor families can afford.194 
Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is an effec-
tive instrument applied in such projects to gener-
ate low income housing on high value city land 
through the participation of private landowners 
and developers. Private landowners, or develop-
ers willing to build houses for existing informal 
dwellers, are given the right to build more than 
the permissible floor space index or floor area 
ratio specified in zoning regulations for the plot. 
If possible, they can build additional space on 
the same plot or be allowed to transfer the devel-
opment right to other plots in specified zones.195 
TDR works where there is a high premium on 
land and where the permissible density is high 
enough to leave surplus land after building low-
income housing.
Government as intermediary and facilitator be-
tween owners and low-income occupiers. In the 
case of Land Sharing as used extensively in the 
Indian city of Hyderabad and to some extent in 
Bangkok, Thailand, the Municipal Corporation of 
Hyderabad and the national Housing Authority 
of Thailand largely play the role of intermediar-
ies. Government authorities in those places help 
to negotiate deals between owners of the land 
and its low-income occupiers. Once agreement is 
reached to share the land, the governments then 
help the occupants to gain access to finance for 
rebuilding housing in the portion of land they are 
to occupy under the shared arrangement. The fee 
for registering the new ownership and transfer of 
property is exempted by the government.196 The 
arrangement works in situations where the origi-
nal landowners have little hope of recovering their 
occupied property without prolonged litigation, 
and where getting even a part of the land back 
has major advantages.
Fostering Citizenship and Legal Empowerment 
through Consultation, Information and 
Participatory Property Reform
Offering public education and legal aid regarding 
market structures to the poor is of critical impor-
tance, otherwise the effectiveness for the poor of 
the above mentioned measures of legal reform, 
governance reform and market development can 
be nullified. Multiple consultations, involvement of 
social organisations in the contacting of property 
holders, well-publicised displays and provision of 
materials to communities all contribute to satisfac-
tion and improved efficiency of property reform. 
In particular, active communication toward and 
participation by civil society are important to en-
sure the quality of systemic change in the property 
rights regime. 
These mechanisms allow beneficiaries to have 
information about the reform’s framework, strate-
gies, implementation and targets as well as to 
Box 10  Slum upgrading  
initiative in Dalifort, 
Senegal 
Upgrading of slums in Dalifort has provided dwell-
ers there with new opportunities and better living 
environment. A formal land title has been granted to 
more than 500 head of households including women 
and their houses have been connected to the basic 
services. Because of its proximity to the city centre, 
rent and land price have steadily risen, and the 
settlement has seen rapid development of high-rise 
housing of good quality. Noticeable growth of new 
economic activities favoured by land security and 
microcredit facilities that have helped slum dwellers 
access start-up funding to initiate income generat-
ing activities that contributed to their economic 
empowerment.               Source: Diop 2007.
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participate in specific stages of the planning 
and implementation of reform. They expand the 
beneficiaries’ capacity to participate, negoti-
ate, influence, control and hold accountable the 
public institutions in charge of property rights 
reform and administration. On a broader scale, 
such measures integrate the positive elements of 
property rules, such as allocation of responsibility 
and liability with the fostering of citizenship and 
social cohesion.197
Recommendations for Policy Design 
and Sequencing
It is advisable to integrate action projects re-
garding the four building blocks of the property 
system into a design that pays attention to addi-
tional elements:
1. Build-in Research and Policy Analysis as well 
as Piloting and Evaluation Schemes ahead of 
Full-scale Implementation. A policy project 
with little policy analysis and research to 
compare methodologies, prioritise areas and 
special measures, pilot innovations or evalu-
ate itself will suffer from a slow institutional 
learning process and will risk to detect dys-
functions late. The long-term sustainability 
of property reforms must be addressed early, 
alongside with potential for conflicts caused 
by reform processes. 
Box  11   Peru regularises the process of  titling property  
within settlements
To initiate the regularisation process of property in each 
settlement, an informational assembly was held to 
explain details of the procedure, obtain approval of the 
assembly. Each assembly was required to designate its 
own representatives. At this stage, problems such as 
multiple or questionable leadership groups were re-
solved. These problems generally arose when there was 
evidence of lack of representation or when those having 
developed clientelistic links with municipal authori-
ties assumed questionable leadership. The strategy 
employed by Peru’s Commission for the Formalisation 
of Informal Property (COFOPRI) in breaking this pattern 
was to establish a direct link with the settler assem-
blies themselves. The assembly made it possible for 
the majority of the settlers to link directly with COFOPRI 
and to decide the best way to initiate the titling process 
and exercise their representation. To this end, 3,500 
informative assemblies were held in 3,500 settlements 
between 1996 and 2000.
Between 1996 and 2001, some 2,274 settlements were 
regularised in all of Peru, which represented one million 
titled families. The 6,000 informative and preparatory 
assemblies held in this period are the clearest proof 
of the high level of citizen participation in the process. 
The meetings informed settlers of the kind of documen-
tation needed by officials charged with creating the list 
of legal occupants. The officials would visit the homes 
of settlers to explain how conflicts and the lack of evi-
dentiary documents might be resolved. 
To promote responsibility among officials in charge of titling services, the parties responsible for delivering 
services to each settlement were clearly identified, so 
residents knew which officials were in charge. Unlike 
the previous titling process, when only certain directors 
had access to information such as changes in titling 
procedures and the identity of the officials responsible, 
COFOPRI guaranteed the right of any person to receive 
information about the titling process and to know the 
officials in charge. Studies developed in 2000 to evalu-
ate the performance of the Peruvian project confirmed 
that these participatory mechanisms raised the com-
munity support and satisfaction with the project.
 Source: Mosquiera, 2007.
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2. Pay Attention to Sequencing. The content 
and sequence of a set of reform actions and 
the setting of priorities will have to be left to 
context-based analysis in national and local 
settings. Formally however, it is important to 
point to the fact that success of the reforms in 
each of the four building blocks of the prop-
erty system will depend not only on the quality 
of the individual measures taken but on the 
sequence in which they are taken. Getting the 
phasing right is as important as the content of 
the individual measures.198
3. Issues of Sovereignty and Territorial Autonomy, 
e.g. regarding indigenous people, must be as-
sessed and tackled prior to reform of property 
rights regimes, or restitution or privatisation in 
sensitive areas. Otherwise the envisioned proc-
ess will be affected negatively, delayed or even 
nullified.199 
4. On-the-Ground Assessments. Even if reform 
measures are carried out diligently they may 
be perceived as interventionist and top-down 
oriented by the poor. Property rights reform 
programmes have often been successful where 
also based on the ground assessment of own-
ership and family relations. Differences in 
family and community structures and spatial 
organisation have to be identified at the field 
level (informal marriages, de-facto headships, 
spontaneous organisation of public spaces, 
etc). In most contexts this planning measure 
facilitates the collection of reliable data about 
possessions and functioning customs, it gives 
the poor a sense of being taken seriously during 
the reform process, produces transparency in 
the property rights’ definition processes, makes 
officials more accountable to the process, con-
tributes to the reduction of conflicts among 
beneficiaries, and might even create bottom-up 
pressure for more legal and regulatory reforms.
5. The Art of the Long Breath. A full scale reform, 
including legal reform and parallel interven-
tions in all four building blocks of the property 
rights system, cannot be carried out within the 
normal cycle of democratic elections and has 
to be sustained over several legislatures. Some 
individual reform benefits might be visible 
rapidly, but sustained beneficial effects only 
take hold if property rights reform is sustained 
and carried out over a long period of time. On 
the macro level, beneficial effects of property 
rights reform will take hold over 10-15 years. 
Given this need for long breath, enlightened 
authoritarian regimes seem to have an easier 
task in property reform than emerging or 
deficient democracies. However, there are 
several ways in which property rights reform 
can be sustained over the normal life cycle of 
a democratic government. One possibility is 
to promote reforms with broad support from 
several parties and to make property reform a 
general interest grounded in the constitution. 
In order to overcome formidable opposition 
from powerful social actors against property 
reform, broad popular demand for reform from 
civil society and the private sector and strong 
coalitions of change are needed. Need assess-
ment, awareness and information campaigns 
among civil society and grass-roots move-
ments need to be fostered to marginalize the 
powerful gatekeepers of the status quo of vast 
extra-legality. This ought to be conceived as 
a multi-stakeholder effort including media, 
business groups and associations of the poor, 
academia, and government agencies favour-
able to change.
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What can Donor Countries and 
Multilateralism do for the Promotion 
of Property Rights of the Global Poor?  
The establishment of fully functional property 
systems and pro-poor reform is first and foremost 
a national and local issue. It demands the rene-
gotiation of institutional, legal and social rela-
tions at national and local levels. Assisting coun-
tries and multilateral organisations are obligated 
not to disrupt ongoing processes of renegotiation. 
Further efforts of donor countries are required to 
design their own laws so that they do not aggra-
vate the problems of the world’s poorest. Donor 
countries, for example, need to deny giving safe 
haven to bank deposits by elites having looted 
resources from the world’s poorest societies, and 
they should actively work to prevent payment of 
domestic company bribes to public officials of 
developing countries.200 Some advocate for an 
active role of international organisations in do-
mestic governance, circumventing domestic elites 
and institutionalising the necessary governance 
reforms.201 To date, there is little evidence to 
suggest that it can make a noticeable difference. 
A better option is to make reforms more sustain-
able by coordinating and supporting broad reform 
measures multilaterally. Concern for longer-term 
endurance of reforms is an important considera-
tion, given that the concerns of individual gov-
ernments may be short-lived due to the fact that 
they are limited to short cycles of legislation. This 
should help to ensure that the reforms will en-
dure over the long term, something that individu-
al governments, limited to short cycles of legisla-
tion, may not normally be able to accomplish.
A System of Multilateral Charters. One of the 
most important development economists has 
proposed a system of charters to legally empower 
the world’s poor. The charters would set minimum 
standards for natural resource revenues to states, 
for checks and balances in governance, budget 
transparency, post conflict management, and for 
investment.202 Property rights are present and 
deserve central attention in all these charters, 
since they could be decisive in making systemic 
property reform sustainable. 
The charter for natural resource revenue, for example, would set minimum standards of 
transparency and fair competition for the auction-
ing of extraction rights, diminish the price risk 
for government of poor countries, honestly broker 
information about money flows to government by 
extraction companies, and set standards for public 
expenditure of natural resource revenue — chan-
nelling it to domestic market development and 
citizen-owned equity funds. The charter for checks 
and balances would set limits to government and/
or private monopolies in the ownership and control 
of media companies and regulate financing and 
spending in election campaigns. The charter for 
budget transparency would commit governments 
to the monthly publication of allocation of assets 
to government institutions in order to allow scru-
tiny from below and install intergovernmental peer 
review mechanisms. The charter for post-conflict 
situations would commit external security and 
legal enforcement forces for the long haul, set up 
transparent budgetary processes and participatory 
government, regulate property restitution and the 
work reconciliation commissions. The investment 
charter would establish credibility by precluding 
governments from strategies of confiscation and 
limit extreme manipulation of exchange rates, pric-
es, and public utility charges. Instead of pushing 
reform processes individually, like minded coun-
tries might also agree on some essential points of 
a property systems reform listed in this report and 
commit to such reform in a charter, complement-
ing the other charters needed to link the world’s 
most poor to the chains of value addition.
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Foster Coalitions of Change in Favour of Equitable 
Property Systems. Donors and international organi-
sations can engage with domestic groups — such 
as businesses, NGOs and grassroots movements of 
peasants and small-business owners — and enlist 
their support for property rights reforms in contact 
with governments. Depending on the circumstanc-
es, fostering coalitions of change by such practices 
may potentially bear fruit. Success requires 
long-term commitment by the parties, a strong 
local ownership, wide stakeholder participation 
and good local management capacity. Donor 
countries and multilateral institutions have an 
important subsidiary role to play in areas of tran-
snational information gathering and distribution, 
education, and technical assistance. Multilateral 
organisations have an important role to play 
in making the engagements of donor countries 
more coherent and coordinated and in provid-
ing standards for intergovernmental peer review. 
Although there is now considerable awareness 
of the importance of property rights for the poor, 
failure to appreciate the historical roots, com-
plexity, and political nature of the underlying is-
sues can give rise to recommendations that may 
not only fail to do justice to the topic but could 
also prove to be  unsustainable. 
Capacity Building and Technical Assistance. 
Given the context-specificity and politically 
sensitive nature of property issues and to make 
services in this area accessible to a majority of 
the population, there is a significant need for 
building capacity on both the technical and 
analytical levels within the public sector as well 
as among other agents who can be mobilised. In 
this domain, the international community and 
donor countries can provide trans-governmental 
or multilaterally coordinated assistance in ca-
pacity building leading to greater sustainability 
of reform programmes.
Seed-financing of Property Reform. Functional 
property systems are self-sustainable. Long 
standing injection of aid from abroad would be 
seen as harmful to this goal or a symptom of 
systemic inadequacy. However, in the early stag-
es, and depending on the context, many of the 
above mentioned reforms might be triggered by 
a combination of technical assistance and seed-
financing from abroad. Such projects should be 
accompanied by clear terms of reference as to 
the timetable and phases on the path to self-
sustainability.
Cross-country Land Policy Indicators. Although 
the importance is widely recognised, it is often 
difficult to integrate land rights into policy dia-
logue or to demonstrate the seriousness of an 
issue due to the lack of comparable indicators. 
Experience in other sectors has shown that de-
fining a simple set of indicators, some of which 
could be generated by the land administration 
system on a routine basis, could make it much 
easier to steer the policy dialogue towards criti-
cal issues and at the same time to measure 
progress over time. Such indicators should in-
clude: (1) coverage and accessibility of the sys-
tem, potential and actual; (2) cost-effectiveness 
of service provision; (3) extent to which govern-
ment holds or acquires land rights and the way 
in which they are exercised, and (4) ways to 
access property through market and non-market 
channels. 
Ranking Systems of Property Rights Afforded to 
Women. In the multilateral sphere, one possible 
approach to addressing the problem of discrimi-
nation of women in property matters would be to 
formulate a rigorous ranking system of property 
rights protection afforded to women. Such an 
index/ranking may focus attention on how dif-
ferent countries score in terms of enforcement, 
protection, scope and depth of rights. Ranking 
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efforts have proved useful in the ‘doing busi-
ness’ environment. Property rights are a com-
ponent of World Bank rankings, but the property 
rights’ components are not gender-specific. A 
separate ranking may draw more attention to the 
issue and prompt improvement in the property-
rights environment for women.
6. Concluding Message
The relevance of fair access to property rights 
goes way beyond their role as economic assets. 
Secure and accessible property rights provide a 
sense of identity, dignity, and belonging to people 
of very different economic means. They create 
reliable ties of rights and obligations among com-
munity members as well as a system of mutual 
recognition of rights and responsibilities beyond 
the local community. For many poor individu-
als and the communities in which they live, the 
relationship with property is more than just an 
aggregate of occupied and used plots. It is the 
very expression of a way of life, and one that they 
should have the opportunity to improve by virtue 
of their own efforts.
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169  USAID 2006: 4.
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tive infrastructure instead of safety nets. Also, having their basic sub-
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farm economy.
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179  Banerjee and Iyer 2005; Nugent and Robinson 2002.
180  Bruce 2006: 47-51.
181  Bird and Slack 2006.
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People scheme to help all citizens to buy homes up to their capability 
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at reducing the cost of housing and easing access to owner occupa-
tion in public housing for all including the lower income residents. The 
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186  World Bank 2003a.
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has been disbursed for housing loans. During the past 12 months (from 
April’06 to March’07) 13,590 houses have been built with housing loans 
amounting to Tk 143.86 million (US$2.07 million) (Grameen Bank).
191  Buckley and Kalarichal 2006.
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194  UN-ESCAP 1994; Banerjee, 1995. Haryana Urban Development 
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land is under agricultural land ceiling and not available for urban use, 
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like Instituto Polis continue to provide advocacy and technical and le-
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approach in several cities of Brazil. In Mumbai TDR is linked with the 
government’s policy of 1999 of providing houses free of cost to 4 million 
slum dwellers in five years. (Burra, 2005.)
196  UN-ESCAP, 1994.
197  See Panaritis,  2007.
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al. 2007; see ILD 1994, 2002, 2004.
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